Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 36

Issue 1

Article 4

9-1-2015

Just Because You Can, Doesn't Mean You Should: Equal
Protection, Free Speech, and Religious Worship
Timothy J. Tracey

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Timothy J. Tracey, Just Because You Can, Doesn’t Mean You Should: Equal Protection, Free Speech, and
Religious Worship, 36 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 58 (2015).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

Just Because You Can, Doesn’t Mean You
Should:
Equal Protection, Free Speech, And Religious
Worship
**

TIMOTHY J. TRACEY*
Surveys suggest that about twelve percent of Evangelical Christian
churches assemble for worship each week in local school buildings. Most of
these churches meet Sunday after Sunday without trouble. However, in the
last five years, a handful of school districts have banned Christian churches
from using their facilities for worship services. Most notoriously, New York
City school officials adopted a policy denying access to anyone seeking to
use school space as a “house of worship.” Some of the churches faced with
these bans have responded with legal action. They and their attorneys
maintain that these worship bans violate the First Amendment doctrine of
equal access—the notion that once the government opens its facilities, it
must extend access to religious and nonreligious groups alike.
But this argument is shortsighted. Equal access is rooted in a principle
of equal protection—that the speech proposed by the religious group is
“similarly situated” to the nonreligious speech already permitted by the
government. That means for churches to leverage equal access they must
analogize their weekly worship services to secular speech activities, like
pep rallies and political speeches. Churches certainly can stretch religious
worship to make these comparisons, but, in the process, they strip worship
of its distinct spiritual character. The Swiss theologian, Karl Barth, described Christian worship as “the most momentous, the most urgent, the
most glorious action that can take place in human life.” No matter how
exciting the football game or how compelling the political candidate, secular expression will never rise to the level of “momentous,” “urgent,” and
“glorious.” For churches to argue otherwise degrades religious worship.
A far better solution is for churches to challenge worship bans under
the Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise Clause, by its very nature,
** This article expands on the author’s chapter in the book, American Law from a
Catholic Perspective: Through a Clearer Lens, edited by Ronald J. Rychlak and published
by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers in March 2015. Any material repurposed from the
chapter has been done so with permission from the publisher. See Equal Protection, Free
Speech, and Religious Worship, in AMERICAN LAW FROM A CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE:
THROUGH A CLEARER LENS 123 (Ronald J. Rychlak ed., 2015).
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recognizes religious worship as special—a sui generis form of expression.
The clause, thus, imposes no requirement on churches to equate worship
with any other type of expression. Churches can seek to vindicate their
rights while at the same time preserving the unique character of worship.
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INTRODUCTION
The film Jurassic Park tells the story of John Hammond, a well-heeled
entrepreneur who brings dinosaurs back to life to use as theme park attractions.1 The film warns against the haphazard use of science. Is it right to
resurrect dangerous creatures that went extinct sixty-five million years ago
for the purpose of entertainment?

*
Associate Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. Thanks to Professor
Stephen L. Mikocick for his helpful feedback. Thanks to Ave Maria School of Law for supporting this project with a summer research grant.
1
See JURASSIC PARK (Universal Pictures 1993). For those who are interested, the book,
Jurassic Park, by Michael Crichton, is significantly better than the movie. See MICHAEL
CRICHTON, JURASSIC PARK: A NOVEL (Random House 1990).
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Dr. Ian Malcolm, an oft-obnoxious mathematician, played by Jeff
Goldblum, is the film’s doomsayer.2 He points out to Hammond:
I'll tell you the problem with the scientific power
that you’re using here, it didn’t require any discipline to attain it. You read what others had done
and you took the next step. You didn’t earn the
knowledge for yourselves, so you don’t take any
responsibility for it. You stood on the shoulders of
geniuses to accomplish something as fast as you
could, and before you even knew what you had,
you patented it, and packaged it, and slapped it on
a plastic lunchbox, and now you're selling it, you
wanna sell it.3
When Hammond pushes back with the assertion that his scientists
“have done things which nobody’s ever done before,” Dr. Malcolm cuts in
with, “Yeah, yeah, but your scientists were so preoccupied with whether or
not they could that they didn’t stop to think if they should.”4
The same could be said of the Christian legal movement. Lawyers
from the likes of the Eagle Forum and the American Family Association too
often bring lawsuits or make legal arguments because they can without
stopping to think whether they should. They argue that private colleges
should face liability under state anti-discrimination laws for disfavoring
Christian student groups, without considering that the majority of private
colleges that want to discriminate are their own religious institutions.5 They
argue that public high schools do not violate the Equal Access Act when
they deny classrooms to gay and lesbian student groups, without consider-

2. See Jurassic Park, Full Cast and Crew, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, perma.cc/76W8-PRJJ (last visited Sept. 13, 2015).
3. Jurassic Park, Quotes, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, perma.cc/7DLF-PS8A (last
visited Sept. 13, 2015).
4. Id. (emphasis added). Ian Malcolm has a similar discourse in the book. He says:
Scientists are actually preoccupied with accomplishment. So
they are focused on whether they can do something. They never stop to ask if they should do something. They conveniently
define such considerations as pointless. If they don’t do it,
someone else will. Discovery, they believe, is inevitable. So
they just try to do it first. That’s the game in science.
MICHAEL CRICHTON, JURASSIC PARK: A NOVEL 284 (Random House 1990) (emphasis in
original).
5. See, e.g., Kelly Sarabyn, Free Speech at Private Universities, 39 J.L. & EDUC.
145, 159-64 (2010).
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ing that the biggest beneficiaries of the Act are their own religious student
groups.6
Or, more recently, Christian lawyers pushed for sectarian prayer at
state and local legislatures.7 But they failed to consider that they denigrated
prayer in the process. To make legislative prayer constitutionally palatable,
they described it as a mere “civic acknowledgment[] of religious belief” or
a token recognition of our “religious heritage.”8 Legislative prayer, the lawyers said, has “the beneficial effects of ‘solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what
is worthy of appreciation in society.’”9 The lawyers ignored the traditional
Christian understanding of prayer: “the raising of one’s mind and heart to
God or the requesting of good things from God.”10
Their arguments worked. The Court held that sectarian, legislative
prayer is fine so long as its purpose is merely “to lend gravity to the occasion and reflect values long part of the Nation’s heritage[;] . . . [or to] invite[] lawmakers to reflect upon shared ideals and common ends before
they embark on the fractious business of governing.”11 And that “lawmakers themselves,” rather than God, are the “principal audience for these invocations.”12 The lawyers, thus, gutted prayer of its spiritual character to
get it to pass muster under the Establishment Clause.
For the believing Christian, prayer is no small thing. Prayer is “a meeting with God and not merely the performance of some religious exercise.”13
“[P]rayer,” said Reuben Archer Torrey, the one-time superintendent of the
Moody Bible Institute, “[is] having an audience with God, actually coming
into the presence of God and asking and getting things from him.”14 It is
more than a tip of the hat to a good ol’ American tradition, like apple pie
and baseball. Yes, the lawyers succeeded in legalizing legislative prayer but
what is left can hardly be considered prayer at all. What is left may look
like prayer, but it has none of the substance of prayer. The lawyers made
the argument because they could, without considering whether they should.
6. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, In Isolated Utah City, New Clubs for Gay Students,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2011), perma.cc/CD72-ZDM6.
7. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
8. Brief for Petitioner at 46, 57, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 3935899, at *46, *57.
9. Id. at *56 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
10. POPE JOHN PAUL II, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2559 (Libreria
Editrice, 2d ed. Vatican 1994), perma.cc/DYM6-7WJN.
11. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1823.
12. Id. at 1825.
13. JAMES MONTGOMERY BOICE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH 455 (Intervarsity Press 1986).
14. REUBEN ARCHER TORREY, THE POWER OF PRAYER 77 (Eerdmans 1955).
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Christian lawyers have been just as careless with their handling of religious worship. Public libraries and schools have increasingly barred
churches from renting space for Sunday morning, worship services.15 The
trend is significant because access to public space matters for many churches in the United States. The North American Mission Board and LifeWay
Research report that about twelve percent of Protestant churches meet in
public schools, and another eight percent meet in community halls, such as
public libraries.16
Christian lawyers have responded to these denials of access with
charges of discrimination.17 The libraries and schools, the lawyers allege,
discriminate by allowing nonreligious groups, like the booster club or the
Young Republicans, to hold rallies but prohibit churches from holding worship services. The thrust of their argument is that the First Amendment
mandates that the government give churches equal access—i.e., the same
access to classrooms, corkboards, and money that the nonreligious community groups receive.
What the lawyers fail to acknowledge is that by arguing equal access,
they necessarily equate a worship service with the everyday, secular speech
already permitted by the government. Equal access requires proof that the
government already plays host to “equivalent secular speech.”18 Lawyers
15. See, e.g., Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2011),
[hereinafter Bronx Household IV] (school district denying church meeting space for Sunday
morning worship service); Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2010)
(university denying Catholic student group funding for items related religious worship);
Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2006), (public
library denying church meeting space for Sunday morning worship service).
16. See Ed Stetzer & Phillip Connor, Research Report, Church Plant Survivability
and Health Study 2007, CTR FOR MISSIONAL RESEARCH, 7 (Feb. 2007), perma.cc/WED9DZRY. Other studies suggest that it is rare for a Roman Catholic Church to meet at a public
school building. See National Congregations Study, Panel Data Set, ASS’N OF RELIGION
DATA ARCHIVES (1998 and 2006-2007), perma.cc/73YC-M3A9 (reporting that 0% of Catholic Churches responded that they met in a school).
17. See Bronx Household of Faith IV, 650 F.3d at 33 (“Plaintiffs brought suit, contending that the Board's denial of Bronx Household's application constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”); Faith Ctr.,
480 F.3d at 904 (“Faith Center argued that the County discriminated against Faith Center on
the basis of the church’s viewpoint when it enforced its old policy prohibiting access to the
meeting room for ‘religious purposes . . . .’”); Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 778 (Catholic
student group contended that a public university “withholding support of religious speech
when equivalent secular speech is funded is a form of forbidden viewpoint discrimination.”).
18. Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 778 (citing Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-30 (1995)). See also University's Distribution of Activity
Fees to Student Group Engaging in Religious Speech, Walsh v. Badger Catholic, Inc., U.S.
SUP. CT. ACTIONS 8 No. 10-731 (Mar. 18, 2011) (observing that “withholding support of
religious speech, when equivalent secular speech was funded, would be a form of forbidden
viewpoint discrimination”) (emphasis added).
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for a Catholic student group at the University of Wisconsin, for instance,
argued that since the school funded the meetings of “a group [that] selfidentifies as ‘worshipping’ the Yankees,” the school also had to support
Catholic masses.19 Fan club meetings, according to the lawyers, were the
“secular equivalent” of a Catholic mass. But analogizing Sunday morning
worship with cheering for a sports team devalues and degrades worship. It
ignores the distinct, spiritual character of what makes worship, worship.
The U.S. Supreme Court has indeed held that the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment obligates the government to grant religious groups
“equal access” to government-run facilities.20 So if the school board allows
the Boy Scouts to hold meetings on a Tuesday evening to teach boys about
character and patriotism, then the Free Speech Clause mandates that the
board also allow religious groups access to do the same from a religious
perspective. But in these equal access cases, the Supreme Court only required schools to give religious groups use of public facilities to talk about
an already permitted subject matter. Schools allowing community groups to
discuss childrearing must allow religious groups to show films discussing
the same subject matter from a religious perspective.21 And schools allowing students to meet for an after-school book club must allow religious
groups to host Bible studies—essentially a book study from a religious perspective.22
Undergirding these religious equal access decisions is the Court’s reliance on a principle of equal protection—that the speech proposed by the
religious group is “similarly situated” to the nonreligious speech already

19. Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 785.
20. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that university must
provide religious student group equal access to school facilities); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that school district must
provide church equal access to show religious film series in school classrooms); Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that university
must provide religious news publication equal access to student activity fee funding); Good
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that school must provide
Christian after-school club equal access to school facilities).
21. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 (“The film series involved here no doubt
dealt with a subject otherwise permissible . . . . and its exhibition was denied solely because
the series dealt with the subject from a religious standpoint.”).
22. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 108 (“Just as there is no question that teaching morals and character development to children is a permissible purpose under Milford's
policy, it is clear that the Club teaches morals and character development to children. . . .
[But] because Milford found the Club’s activities to be religious in nature—‘the equivalent
of religious instruction itself,’—it excluded the Club from use of its facilities.”) (citation
omitted).
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permitted by the government.23 That the religious group’s speech furthers
the government’s purpose (e.g., promoting the welfare of the community or
fostering a robust, academic debate on a college campus) to the same extent
as the nonreligious groups’ speech already permitted by the government.
But the Court has never said that the government must open its facilities to religious worship. Indeed, it seems to imply the opposite. “[M]ere
religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values,” the Court
suggests, may be excluded because there is no secular analog to worship. 24
The “secular equivalent speech” necessary for an equal access claim does
not exist. Worship is not just a religious perspective on character or childrearing. It is wholly different—“similarly situated” to no secular activities.
“Prayer and worship services are not religious viewpoints on the subjects
addressed in Boy Scout Rituals or in Elks Club ceremonies. Worship is
adoration, not ritual; and any other characterization of it is both profoundly
demeaning and false.”25
Christians view the Lord’s Day, and Sunday morning worship in particular, as “separate and unique.”26 “The Lord’s Day is set apart from the
rest of the week, so the acts of worship are hallowed, or set apart from the
rest of activities of life.”27 God alone is worshipped. “The only true and
23. The Supreme Court in Police Dept. of the City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972), analyzed the effect of a Chicago ordinance that barred all forms of picketing except
for laboring picketing. The Court explained:
Because Chicago treats some picketing differently from others,
we analyze this ordinance in terms of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course, the equal
protection claim in this case is closely intertwined with First
Amendment interests; the Chicago ordinance affects picketing,
which is expressive conduct; moreover, it does so by classifications formulated in terms of the subject of the picketing.
Id. at 94-95 (footnote omitted). See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 463 (1980) (analyzing almost identical picketing statute and stating, “Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of
a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express
less favored or more controversial views.”).
24. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112 n.4 (“[W]e conclude that the Club's activities do not constitute mere religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values.”); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840 (distinguishing between a news publication taking a
religious editorial viewpoint, which the First Amendment requires a university to fund, and
“religious organizations . . . whose purpose is to practice a devotion to an acknowledged
ultimate reality or deity,” which the First Amendment perhaps allows a university to fund
but does not require it.).
25. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Calabresi, J., concurring) [hereinafter Bronx Household III].
26. D.G. HART & JOHN R. MUETHER, WITH REVERENCE AND AWE 67-68 (P&R Publishing 2002).
27. Id.
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acceptable worship is worship directed to him. If not directed to him, it is
not worship no matter how decorous or impressive the ceremony.”28 Religious worship, thus, sits in a class by itself.
Christian lawyers could, and in fact already have, equate Sunday
morning worship with secular, speech-related activities to squeeze it into
the mold of the Court’s equal access cases, but it is not what they should
do. Casting worship as simply a religious version of a pep rally comes at a
price. It cheapens worship, and strips worship of its spiritual meaning. The
argument is convenient, and perhaps even successful,29 but it should be
offensive to Christian believers.
Instead, churches and their lawyers should consider suing under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, rather than the Free Speech
Clause. A worship service is the paradigmatic example of religious exercise. The U.S. Supreme Court specifically recognized in Employment Division v. Smith that “the ‘exercise of religion’” includes “assembling with
others for a worship service.”30
Unlike an equal access claim, a free exercise claim requires no proof
that religious worship is “similarly situated” to any other expression. It is
no longer necessary to scrounge around looking for “equivalent secular
speech” or to resort to strained analogies to tailgate parties or political rallies. The Free Exercise Clause protects religion alone. As Justice Scalia put
it, the clause provides “discriminatory protection of freedom of religion.”31
It recognizes religion as special, deserving of constitutional protection regardless of the similarity between religious activity and any nonreligious
activities permitted by the government.32 With a free exercise claim, a
church can protect worship, without degrading it in the process.
The government violates the Free Exercise Clause when it “in a selective manner impose[s] burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief.”33 The typical use policy in these cases burdens only religious worship.
For instance, the New York Board of Education’s policy authorizes the use
28. JAMES MONTGOMERY BOICE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH 587 (Intervarsity Press 1987).
29. See Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 781 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding
that university’s refusal to fund student group’s religious worship while funding “equivalent
secular speech” violated principle of equal access).
30. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990).
31. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. See Thomas v. Rev. Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) (“Only beliefs rooted in
religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion.”).
33. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543
(1993). See also Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. at 877 (noting that the Free Exercise Clause forbids
the government from “impos[ing] special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status”).
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of school facilities for holding “social, civic, and recreational meetings and
entertainment, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community,”
but provides that “[n]o permit shall be granted for the purpose of holding
religious worship services, or otherwise using a school as a house of worship.”34 Likewise, the Contra Costa County Library in California makes its
rooms generally available to the public for “educational, cultural and community related meetings, programs and activities,” but mandates that the
rooms “shall not be used for religious services.”35 The policies single out
religious worship for exclusion, which is precisely what the Free Exercise
Clause forbids. If churches are to pursue religious worship claims at all,
they should do so under the Free Exercise Clause rather than the Free
Speech Clause.
Part I of this Article breaks down the basic principles of equal protection, in particular, the threshold requirement that the individuals or groups
alleged to have been treated differently are “similarly situated with respect
to the purpose of the law.”36 Part II considers how the Supreme Court has
predicated the free speech doctrine of equal access on these principles. Part
III shows how equal protection has become the dominant mode by which
the Court analyzes religious speech claims. Part IV surveys the lower, federal court cases where Christian lawyers have argued that religious worship
is similarly situated to everyday, secular speech in an effort to secure access
to government facilities. Part V warns of the dangers of correlating religious worship with secular, nonreligious speech, like cheering for a sports
team or idolizing a movie star. Finally, Part VI suggests, if churches opt to
challenge the government’s exclusion of religious worship, their lawyers
should use the Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise Clause, unlike the
Free Speech Clause, maintains the distinct, spiritual character of worship,
since it uniquely applies to religious activity and does not require analogizing religious worship to secular activity.

34. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 2011)
(Bronx Household IV).
35. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 895 (9th Cir.
2007).
36. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341, 346 (1949). See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985) (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412
(1920)) (“The Equal Protection Clause directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike.’”); 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.2(a) (2013). (“Equal protection is
the guarantee that similar people will be dealt with in a similar manner and that people of
different circumstances will not be treated as if they were the same.”).
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I. THE ABC’S OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Christian lawyers must recognize that pushing religious worship under
the rubric of equal access necessarily entails a claim that worship is “similarly situated” to everyday, secular speech. The principles of equal protection provide the framework by which the U.S. Supreme Court analyzes
equal access cases. To understand the difficulty with the lawyers’ arguments about religious worship, it is, thus, imperative to grasp the fundamentals of equal protection.
A.

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EQUAL PROTECTION

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands
that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”37 Though nothing in the Constitution’s text imposes a
similar restriction on the federal government, the U.S. Supreme Court has
construed the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause as “contain[ing] an
equal protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously
discriminating between individuals or groups.”38 Under most circumstances, the Amendments afford the same protections.
The Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit government from discriminating in all circumstances. It “guarantees that similar individuals will
be dealt with in a similar manner by the government. It does not reject the
government’s ability to classify persons or ‘draw lines’ in the creation and
application of laws.”39 All laws classify people at some level. They impose
burdens or confer benefits on a selective basis, singling out some people or
activities for treatment different from that accorded to other people or activities. A police officer who enforces a speed limit pulls over fast drivers and
allows other drivers to pass by unchecked. A law regulating child labor
treats employers who hire ten-year-olds differently from those who hire
twenty-five-year-olds. The government discriminates in both instances; yet
no court would hold that the government has run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause, thus, aims only at prohibiting arbitrary
or invidious discrimination—i.e., from employing classifications that cannot be justified on the basis of a legitimate government interest or that are
adopted merely for the sake of harming a particular group of persons.40 The
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1.
38. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
39. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 36.
40. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause
requires the consideration of whether the classifications drawn by any statute constitute an
arbitrary and invidious discrimination.”).
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government, for instance, violates equal protection when it offers public
education to whites but not to blacks41 or permits women to drink at age
eighteen, but forces men to wait until age twenty-one.42 Someone’s race is
irrelevant to whether they deserve a public education, and someone's gender
has no bearing on the risk they present when drunk driving. But when government, for example, excludes persons with no athletic ability from playing for the state university’s football team, the government no doubt discriminates, but it can hardly be called arbitrary or invidious.43 Someone’s
athletic prowess has everything to do with their ability to meaningfully contribute on the football field.
B.

THE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT OF BEING “SIMILARLY
SITUATED”

The prerequisite to any equal protection claim is proof that the individuals or groups alleged to have been treated differently are “similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the law.”44 “[T]here is,” said the U.S.
Supreme Court, “a threshold question whether the [individuals or groups]
are indeed similarly situated for constitutional purposes.”45 The Court has
said the same as far back as 1884, just sixteen years after the ratification of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Government
action, said the Court, which in “its operation . . . affects alike all persons
similarly situated, is not within the amendment.”46
For instance, in United States v. Armstrong,47 the Supreme Court considered a selective prosecution claim by a group of criminal defendants.
The defendants alleged that the government brought drug charges against
them only because they were black, and that the government failed to prosecute people of other races for the same crimes. “The requirements for a
selective-prosecution claim,” said the Court, “draw ‘on ordinary equal protection standards.’”48 The defendants must make a threshold showing that
41. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
43. See Trina Jones, The Diversity Rationale: A Problematic Solution, 1 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L.171, 205 (2005) (noting that “athletic ability, alumni connections, etc. are not
subject to equal protection analysis, these components of diversity programs will always be
upheld unless they are proven to be a cover for intentional discrimination against a protected
group”).
44. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, supra note 36.
45. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997).
46. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1884) (emphasis added); see also David
E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
211, 234-36 (1999).
47. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
48. Id. at 465 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
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“similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted.”49
Because the defendants “failed to identify individuals who were not black
and could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents
were charged, but were not so prosecuted,” they could not move forward
with their claim.50 The defendants’ equal protection claims, thus, stumbled
out of the gate because of their inability to make a threshold showing of
similarly situated individuals.
But what does it mean to be “similarly situated”? The Court measures
whether individuals or groups are “similarly situated” relative to the “purpose of the law” being challenged. Every law has a purpose, either to prevent a societal evil or to promote a societal good. A law forbidding murder,
for instance, seeks to prevent the societal evil of killing. Whereas, a law
providing tax breaks for charitable contributions seeks to promote the societal good of philanthropy. The Court deems individuals or groups to be
“similarly situated” when they present the same evil the government seeks
to prevent or present the same good that the government seeks to promote.51
And when the government nonetheless treats these similarly situated individuals or groups differently, it runs afoul of equal protection.
Think back to the drinking-age example above. The legislature’s purpose in passing the law was to combat the evil of drunk driving. The legislature chose to accomplish that purpose by raising the drinking age for men
but not for women. The legislature’s decision to discriminate against men in
favor of women violates equal protection. It does so not simply because the
law distinguishes between men and women, but rather, because the law
treats men and women differently even though they are “similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law.”52 Both men and women present the
same evil the legislature is trying to prevent—hazardous driving while
drunk—and yet the legislature treats them unevenly by penalizing men but
not women.53
The outcome would be different if the legislature had credible evidence that men are more likely than women to drink and drive. In that case,
men and women would no longer be “similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the law.” Men would present the evil of drunk driving to a
greater degree than women. The legislature could then distinguish between
men and women without transgressing the Equal Protection Clause.

49. Id.
50. Id. at 470.
51. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, supra note 36, at 346 (“The purpose
of a law may be either the elimination of a public ‘mischief’ or the achievement of some
positive public good.”).
52. Id.at 336.
53. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976).
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Consider the Armstrong54 case again. What thwarted the defendants’
selective prosecution claim was their failure to show that the other individuals they had identified presented the same evil—distributing crack cocaine
through an organized drug ring—as they did. In the defendants’ case:
[T]here was over 100 grams of cocaine base involved, over twice the threshold necessary for a ten
year mandatory minimum sentence; there were
multiple sales involving multiple defendants,
thereby indicating a fairly substantial crack cocaine
ring; . . . there were multiple federal firearms violations intertwined with the narcotics trafficking; the
overall evidence in the case was extremely strong,
including audio and videotapes of defendants; . . .
and several of the defendants had criminal histories
including narcotics and firearms violations.55
The other individuals the defendants identified had engaged in drug
trafficking, but not at the same volume and level of sophistication as the
defendants. These individuals did not present the same evil as the defendants and, thus, could not be considered similarly situated. The government
could prosecute the defendants more severely than these individuals without violating equal protection.
The Court employed a similar equal protection analysis in Michael M.
v. Superior Court.56 The defendant challenged California’s statutory rape
law as violative of equal protection. He claimed that the law unlawfully
discriminated on the basis of gender because it made men, but not women,
criminally liable for sexual intercourse with minors.57 The Court rejected
the defendant’s contention, since he could not make a threshold showing
that men and women were “similarly situated with respect to the purpose of
the law.”
We need not be medical doctors to discern that
young men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of
sexual intercourse. Only women may become
pregnant, and they suffer disproportionately the
54. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
55. Id. at 460 (quoting Assistant United States Attorney Aff. at 81).
56. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
57. See id. at 466; see also id. at 476 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The petitioner contends that this state law, which punishes only males for the conduct in question, violates his
Fourteenth Amendment right to the equal protection of the law.”).
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profound physical, emotional, and psychological
consequences of sexual activity. The statute at issue here protects women from sexual intercourse at
an age when those consequences are particularly
severe.58
Federal and state courts have routinely called upon claimants in samesex marriage cases to prove that they are “similarly situated” to oppositesex couples with respect to the purpose of marriage laws.59 For example, in
Varnum v. Brien,60 the Iowa Supreme Court considered the argument that
“the plaintiffs are not similarly situated to heterosexuals.”61 “Under this
threshold test,” said the court, “if plaintiffs cannot show as a preliminary
matter that they are similarly situated, [we will] not further consider whether their different treatment under a statute is permitted under the equal protection clause.”62
To determine whether they are similarly situated, the court said, “[t]he
purposes of the law must be referenced.”63 The purpose of Iowa’s marriage
law, according to the court, was to “provid[e] an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in
organized society.”64 The court held that, “with respect to the subject and
purposes of Iowa’s marriage laws, we find that the plaintiffs are similarly
situated compared to heterosexual persons. . . . [O]fficial recognition of
their status provides an institutional basis for defining their fundamental
relational rights and responsibilities, just as it does for heterosexual couples.”65
58. Id. at 471-72.
59. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 435 n.54 (Cal. 2008), superseded by
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207
P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009), invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D.
Cal. 2010); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 423-24 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882 (Iowa 2009); see also Courtney Megan Cahill, Celebrating the Differences That Could Make a Difference: United States v. Virginia and a New
Vision of Sexual Equality, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 943, 964 (2009) (noting that marriage equality
opponents in California and Iowa had “tried to argue, again unsuccessfully, that the ‘[same
sex couple] plaintiffs are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples so as to necessitate
further equal protection analysis because the plaintiffs cannot ‘procreate naturally’” (alteration in original) (quoting Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 882)).
60. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d 862.
61. Id. at 882.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 883. See also Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 37, at 347 (It is “impossible to pass judgment on the reasonableness of a [legislative] classification without taking
into consideration, or identifying, the purpose of the law.”).
64. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883.
65. Id.
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The prerequisite then to every equal protection claim is a showing that
the individuals or groups alleged to have been treated differently are “similarly situated.” The Supreme Court has imposed this same preliminary hurdle to equal access claims under the Free Speech Clause. The claimants’
proposed speech must be “similarly situated” to the speech already permitted by the government.

II. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN EQUAL PROTECTION AND FREE
SPEECH
“In adjudicating first amendment issues of freedom of speech and expression,” Michael Paulsen points out, “the Supreme Court has borrowed
freely from the conceptual apparatus of its equal protection doctrine.”66
Kenneth Karst said the same. “[T]he principle of equal liberty lies at the
heart of the first amendment’s protections against government regulation of
the content of speech.”67
The Supreme Court itself has said that free speech “intersects with”
and “closely intertwines with” the “guarantee of equal protection.”68 Equal
protection, said the Court, is “fused [into] the First Amendment.”69 The
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment guarantees that the government
will treat the expression of viewpoints and ideas evenhandedly.
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection
Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself,
government may not grant the use of a forum to
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny
use to those wishing to express less favored or
more controversial views. And it may not select
which issues are worth discussing or debating in
public facilities. There is an “equality of status in
the field of ideas,” and government must afford all
points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.70
66. Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 327
(1986).
67. Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 21 (1975). See also Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection:
On Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2426 (2003) (“[T]he
First Amendment frowns on laws that draw express viewpoint-based distinctions.”).
68. Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1980).
69. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 n.4 (1992).
70. Mosely, 408 U.S. at 96; see also Carey, 447 U.S. at 462-63 (same).
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Thus, as Paulsen observes, “[T]his first amendment equality principle
is clearly the core element in cases of a purported ‘public forum.’”71
A.

THE SUPREME COURT’S HISTORICAL RELIANCE ON EQUAL
PROTECTION ANALYSIS IN ITS FREE SPEECH CASES

The U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, struck down a City of Chicago
ordinance that prohibited picketing outside of Chicago public schools except for “peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.”72
Earl Mosley, a city resident, sought to walk “the public sidewalk adjoining
[Jones Commercial High School], carrying a sign that read: ‘Jones High
School practices black discrimination. Jones High School has a black quota.’”73 The City’s picketing ordinance barred Mosley from protesting racial
discrimination outside of the high school, but allowed teachers’ unions to
protest low wages outside the very same high school.74 Because of the government’s uneven treatment of these protests—First Amendment free
speech—the Court said, “denied [Mosley] equal protection of the law in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”75
The Court’s reasoning hinged on Mosley’s desired speech being “similarly situated” to the speech the City of Chicago already permitted.76 Mosley wanted to picket just like the teachers’ unions could picket. The city
claimed it passed the ordinance to combat the evil of “school disruption.”77
Mosley and the teachers’ unions were “similarly situated” with regard to
this evil. Protests by both created the same risk of interfering with school
activities.78 Yet the City of Chicago permitted labor protests by teachers’
unions but not a civil rights protest by Mosely.79 “Such unequal treatment,”

71. Paulsen, supra note 66, at 328. Professor William Van Alstyne considered the
application of this First Amendment equality principle in the context of public universities
barring Communist speakers from their “auditorium, amphitheater, or student union—
campus places traditionally thought to be proper forums for discussion of heterodox ideas
and political issues.” William Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some
Constitutional Considerations, 11 U. PA. L. REV. 321, 321 (1963). He said, “[I]n regulating
the use of its facilities, a state university may not discriminate among speakers on the bases
either of their affiliation, or the controversial or allegedly disreputable nature of their opinions. The problem is, at heart, . . . a function of the equal protection clause.” Id. at 338.
72. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 93.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 93-94.
75. Id. at 94-98.
76. Id. at 99-102.
77. Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99-100 (1972).
78. Id. at 100.
79. Id. at 100-102.

74

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

36

said the Court, “is exactly what was condemned” by the principle of equal
protection.80
Now if Mosley had wanted to hold a rock concert outside of Jones
Commercial High School, that would have been a different case. A rock
concert is not “similarly situated” to a peaceful labor protest. It creates a
much greater risk of school disruption than a peaceful protest. One is a
noisy, musical performance while the other is a quiet demonstration. Because Mosley’s rock concert would not be “similarly situated” to the speech
already permitted by the City of Chicago—the peaceful, labor picketing—
the city could prohibit the rock concert while allowing the protest without
any concern for running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. The Mosley
court put it this way: The City of Chicago could prohibit Mosley’s speech if
it was “clearly more disruptive than the picketing Chicago already permits.”81 But that was not the case.
The Court employed the same equal protection analysis in Carey v.
Brown, the facts of which largely paralleled those of Mosley.82 Members of
a civil rights organization called the Committee Against Racism “participated in a peaceful demonstration on the public sidewalk in front of the
home of Michael Bilandic, then Mayor of Chicago, protesting his alleged
failure to support the busing of schoolchildren to achieve racial integration.”83 They were arrested and charged under an antipicketing ordinance,
which prohibited picketing in residential neighborhoods, except for “peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute.”84 The
legislature passed the residential picketing ban, according to the City of

80. Id. at 100-01. The Court invalidated a nearly identical antipicketing ordinance in
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S 104 (1972). There, Richard Grayned was convicted
for participating in a demonstration in front of West Senior High School in Rockford, Illinois. He, along with about 200 others, carried signs calling for equal rights for black students—“Black cheerleaders to cheer too”; “Black history with black teachers”; “Equal
rights, Negro counselors.” The ordinance, like the one in Mosley, prohibited all picketing
outside a public school building except for “peaceful picketing of any school involved in a
labor dispute.” The Court said:
This ordinance is identical to the Chicago disorderly conduct
ordinance we have today considered in Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley . . . . For the reasons given in Mosley, we .
. . hold that [the ordinance] violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellant’s conviction
under this invalid ordinance must be reversed.
Id. at 107. The Court again used an equal protection mode of analysis to a free speech claim.
81. Id. at 100.
82. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
83. Id. at 457.
84. Id.
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Chicago, to prevent the evil of “intrud[ing] on the tranquility of the
home.”85
The Court found the ordinance “constitutionally indistinguishable
from the ordinance invalidated in Mosley.”86 “There can be no doubt,” said
the Court, “that in prohibiting peaceful picketing on the public streets and
sidewalks in residential neighborhoods, the Illinois statute regulates expressive conduct that falls within the First Amendment’s preserve.”87 The Court
ruled that labor and nonlabor picketing were “equally likely to intrude on
the tranquility of the home.”88 “[N]othing inherent in the nature of peaceful
labor picketing . . . make[s] it any less disruptive of residential privacy than
peaceful picketing on issues of broader social concern.”89 Thus, both types
of picketing were “similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law.” For the City to treat them differently was “[in]consistent with the
command of the Equal Protection Clause.”90
Just as in Mosley, if the City had had evidence that the Committee
Against Racism’s picketing was more disruptive than the already allowed
labor picketing, the Court presumably would have reached the opposite
result. No longer would the Committee’s speech be “similarly situated with
respect to the purpose of the law.” The Committee’s picketing would present the evil of “intrud[ing] on the tranquility of the home” to a greater degree than labor picketing, and the City could constitutionally forbid the
Committee’s speech while at the same time allowing labor picketing.91
85. Id. at 462.
86. Id. at 460. Indeed, the Court “discern[ed] no principled basis for distinguishing
the Illinois statute from a similar picketing prohibition invalidated in Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley.” Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 458 (1980) (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 460.
88. Id. at 462.
89. Id. at 465.
90. Id. at 471. Justice Stewart makes clear in his concurrence that while the Court
speaks in terms of equal protection, “what was actually at stake in Mosley, and is at stake
here, is the basic meaning of the constitutional protection of free speech.” Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 471(1980) (Stewart, J., concurring). In other words, while the Court used the
language of equal protection, it was in fact addressing a free speech claim.
91. See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring and
dissenting). In Cox, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Louisiana breach of peace
statute that prohibited picketing on a public street or sidewalk, but “expressly provide[d] that
the statute shall not bar picketing and assembly by labor unions protesting unfair treatment
of union members.” Id. at 580. The law was applied to convict a group of civil rights protestors. Justice Black found the law “to be censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” He said, “[T]o deny this appellant and his
group use of the streets because of their views against racial discrimination, while allowing
other groups to use the streets to voice opinions on other subjects, also amounts, I think, to
an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. at 581.
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The Supreme Court continues to apply an equal protection mode of
analysis to its free speech cases. But the Court generally employs the language of free speech—using terms such as “viewpoint,” “subject matter,”
and “speech forum”—rather than the language of equal protection used by
the Court in cases like Mosley and Carey.92
When the government opens up its property, such as a library meeting
room or a school classroom, for members of the public to hold meetings, or
to engage in other expressive activities, the government creates what the
Court has called a “speech forum.” The government must generally regulate
access to a speech forum in an evenhanded manner. It cannot favor some
speech or viewpoints over others. For instance, if it allows the local Crisis
Pregnancy Center to hold a meeting about pregnancy and the joys of motherhood, it must also allow the local chapter of Planned Parenthood to hold
meetings about contraception and abortion.
But the Supreme Court has recognized that “[the government], no less
than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under
its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”93 It can thus exclude speech to ensure it is properly “limiting the use of its property to its
intended purpose.”94 If a speaker “wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum,” the government may exclude the
speaker with impunity.95

92. For instance, in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), Mary Rebecca Freeman, the treasurer for a state political campaign, challenged Tennessee statutes that prohibited the solicitation of votes and the display of campaign materials within 100 feet of the
entrance to a polling place. See id. at 193-95. The Court held that the statutes were “contentbased restrictions.” Id. at 198. “Whether individuals may exercise their free speech rights
near polling places,” said the Court, “depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a
political campaign. The statute does not reach other categories of speech, such as commercial solicitation, distribution, and display.” Id. at 197. Although the Court employed the
language of free speech, discussing “content discrimination” and “content-neutral time,
place, or manner restriction[s],” the Court ruled that the statute “raise[d] Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection concerns because, in the course of regulating speech, such
restrictions differentiate between types of speech.” Id. at 197 n.3. See also Members of City
Council of L.A. v. Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816 (1984) (relying on Mosley and Carey to hold
that creating an exception for certain political signs but not others would run afoul of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. “To create an exception for appellees’ political speech
and not these other types of speech might create a risk of engaging in constitutionally forbidden content discrimination.”).
93. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976).
94. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
95. Id. at 806.
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So, just as under the Court’s equal protection analysis in Mosley and
Carey, the prerequisite to a successful speech claim is a showing that the
proposed speech is “similarly situated” with respect to the purpose of the
forum. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,96 for
example, the purpose of the government’s charitable campaign was “to
provide a means for traditional health and welfare charities to solicit contributions in the federal workplace.”97 The government could exclude the likes
of the NAACP and the Sierra Club because their focus was not on serving
the poor, but on “political activity, advocacy, lobbying, [and] litigation.”98
They sought to “address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the
forum.”99 The Court concluded: “[T]he President could reasonably conclude that a dollar directly spent on providing food or shelter to the needy is
more beneficial than a dollar spent on litigation that might or might not
result in aid to the needy.”100 Including the NAACP and Sierra Club would
“hinder [the charitable campaign’s] effectiveness for its intended purpose.”101 The government could thus exclude these advocacy groups without fear of transgressing the Constitution.102
To put it in equal protection terms, the proposed speech of the NAACP
and the Sierra Club was not “similarly situated” to the speech already allowed in the campaign. The groups presently in the campaign were soliciting money to “provide direct health and welfare services to needy persons.”103 They fit squarely within the purpose of the campaign—“to provide
a means for traditional health and welfare charities to solicit contributions
in the federal workplace.”104 The political activism of the NAACP and Sierra Club did not fit with this purpose in the same way. Their speech was not
“similarly situated with respect to the purpose” of the forum. The government could thus leave the advocacy groups out of the campaign without
contravening the Constitution. The Court in Cornelius applied this same
mode of analysis, but used the language of free speech, rather than the language of equal protection.
The Court’s language has changed, but its methodology has not. It still
considers whether a claimant’s proposed speech is “similarly situated” to
96. Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788.
97. Id. at 806.
98. Id. at 793.
99. Id. at 806.
100. Id. at 809.
101. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985).
102. In contrast, the purpose of a speech forum, like a sidewalk, street, or park, according to the Court, is “the free exchange of ideas.” Id. at 800. The forum is wide open.
Pretty much any proposed speech will be considered “within the purpose of the forum.” Id.
at 806. Any exclusion of speech, thus, will likely run afoul of the Constitution.
103. Id. at 812.
104. Id. at 806.
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the speech already allowed by the government. Does the claimant’s proposed speech square with the government’s purpose to the same degree that
the speech already permitted by the government does? But the Court no
longer makes this consideration by using the phrase “similarly situated.”
Instead, the Court asks whether a claimant “wishes to address a topic not
encompassed within the purpose of the forum.”105 If a claimant cannot clear
this initial hurdle, it will not prevail on a claim of impermissible discrimination.

III. THE APPLICATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION TO RELIGIOUS SPEECH
The Court has made frequent recourse to this equal protection methodology, in particular, when considering the government regulation of religious speech. In fact, Justice Harlan famously said that the application of
the First Amendment to religion “requires an equal protection mode of
analysis.”106
Niemotko v. Maryland107 and Fowler v. Rhode Island108 offer early examples of the Court’s reliance on equal protection to analyze claims involving religious speech. In Niemotko, a city denied a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses a permit to use a municipal park for Bible talks.109 The city regularly
allowed other groups to use the park for events such as picnics and Flag
Day ceremonies.110 The city claimed that the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ meetings were different because they were more likely to be “detrimental to the
public peace or order.”111 The Supreme Court disagreed. The Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ talks, according to the Court, were “similarly situated” to the
other “organizations and individuals desiring to use [the park] for meetings
and celebrations,” which the city had approved.112 The Jehovah’s Witnesses
were no more likely than the Order of Elks or the Sunday-school picnics to
interfere with the park being “a sanctuary for peace and quiet.”113
The city’s uneven treatment of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Court
said, violated “[t]he right to equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of
those freedoms of speech and religion protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.”114 Justice Frankfurter put it, “[t]o allow expression of reli105. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
106. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
107. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
108. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
109. See Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 272-73.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 271.
112. Id. at 269, 272-73.
113. Id. at 273.
114. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951).
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gious views by some and deny the same privilege to others merely because
they or their views are unpopular, even deeply so, is a denial of equal protection of the law forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.”115
The Court relied heavily on Niemotko in Fowler,116 where again the
Jehovah’s Witnesses were refused permission to conduct religious services
in a city park.117 The Court found that the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ services
were “similarly situated” to the other religious services already allowed in
the park. Their services were “quiet, orderly meeting[s] with no disturbances or breaches of the peace,” just the same as those of other religious
sects.118 “Catholics could hold mass in Slater Park and Protestants could
conduct their church services there without violating the ordinance.”119 The
Niemotko case, the Court said, was “on all fours with this one.”120 It determined that the ordinance “as so construed and applied violated the First and
the Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.”121 For the park to allow
“all religious groups” except for Jehovah’s Witnesses, was “discrimination”
barred by the Free Speech and Equal Protection Clauses.122
Equal protection became the dominant method by which the Supreme
Court analyzed religious speech claims starting with Widmar v. Vincent123
in 1981. In Widmar, the Court relied on equal protection cases like Mosley,
Carey, and Fowler, to hold that “if a university permits students and others
to use its property for secular purposes, it must also furnish facilities to religious groups for the purposes of worship and the practice of their religion.”124 The University said, “[t]he overall goal [of its student activities
program was] to develop social and cultural awareness as well as intellectual curiosity.”125 The provision of University facilities to a religious student
group, Cornerstone, according to the Court, furthered this goal just as much
as giving access to secular student groups, like the Students for a Democratic Society and the Young Socialist Alliance. They were, thus, “similarly
situated” with regard to this goal. So by opening school facilities to secular
115. Id. at 284 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
116. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
117. See id. at 68.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 69.
120. Id.
121. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 68-69 (1953).
122. Id. at 69-70. See also id. at 69 (“For it plainly shows that a religious service of
Jehovah’s Witnesses is treated differently than a religious service of other sects. That
amounts to the state preferring some religious groups over this one.”).
123. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
124. Id. at 289 (White, J., dissenting).
125. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1312 n.1 (8th Cir. 1980) (quoting from the
University bulletin’s description of the student activities program), aff’d sub nom., Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
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student groups, but denying those same facilities to religious student
groups, the University violated “equal protection and freedom of speech
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”126 The principle of equal protection embedded in the Court’s
free speech jurisprudence mandated that the University provide religious
speakers use of school facilities “on equal terms with others.”127 This basic
principle became known as “equal access.”128
The Court repeatedly reaffirmed the principle of equal access over the
next thirty years. Whether the Court considered a religious group’s access
to classrooms,129 its use of school corkboards,130 its receipt of government
money,131 its use of a city plaza to display religious symbols,132 or even its
complaints about having to fund distasteful student groups,133 the Court
relied on equal access—this rule of equal protection ingrained in the Free
Speech Clause.
126.
127.
128.

Widmar, 454 U.S. at 266.
Id. at 272 n.12.
See Alliance Defending Freedom, Equal Access: Frequently Asked Questions,
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM BLOG, perma.cc/75L9-BR5P. The Alliance Defending
Freedom helpfully explains “equal access” in its FAQ as follows:
The term “equal access” refers to the constitutional principle
that whenever the government creates a forum for private expression, religious groups and individuals have the right to use
that forum under the same terms and conditions as everyone
else. The government may not impose special restrictions on
religious speech. A forum could be anything that is intended to
allow for private expression. Places such as parks, sidewalks,
meeting facilities (like community centers, public school
buildings, library meeting rooms, etc.), and advertising spaces
(like bulletin boards) are just a few of the most common examples.
Id.
129. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263; (considering university’s provision of “facilities
for the meetings of registered organizations”); see also Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387-88 (1993) (considering church’s application “for
permission to use school facilities to show a six-part film series containing lectures by Doctor James Dobson”); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001) (considering school board’s “regulations governing the use of . . . school facilities”).
130. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247 (1990)
(considering religious student group’s “access to the school newspaper, bulletin boards,
public address system, and the annual Club Fair”).
131. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 826-27
(1995) (considering religious student publication’s application for student activity fees).
132. See Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (First
Amendment required city to permit group to display cross in public square open to broad
spectrum of groups).
133. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 230
(2002) (examining First Amendment rights of “complaining students . . . being required to
pay fees which are subsidies for speech they find objectionable, even offensive”).
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As with speech forum cases more generally, the Court often discussed
equal access in terms of free speech—referring to permissible subject matters and viewpoint discrimination—rather than in terms of equal protection.
But its rationale remained rooted in equal protection. The Court consistently considered whether the proposed religious speech was “similarly situated” to the secular speech already allowed by the government. Did the religious group’s proposed speech raise the same evils and promote the same
goods as the speech presently allowed by the government?
The Court affirmed that when religious speech was not “similarly situated,” the government could exclude it without penalty. “The necessities of
confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was
created,” the Court said, “may justify the State in reserving it for certain
groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”134 The government may exclude religious speech where it does not further the purpose of its forum to
the same extent as the speech already permitted by the government.
But the opposite is just as true. When the proposed religious speech is
“similarly situated” to the speech already allowed by the government, the
government must allow the religious speech. To do otherwise would violate
the Constitution. For instance, in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District,135 the Court held that the First Amendment required a
New York school district to provide meeting space for a church to show
Christian films about child rearing.136 The Court’s reasoning turned on the
fact that the church’s proposed speech—showing the films—and the speech
already permitted by the district were “similarly situated” with respect to
the purpose of the forum. The district opened its facilities to community
groups for the purpose of “social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community.” 137
The district permitted lectures and films “about child rearing and family

134. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. See also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 281 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he University may exercise a measure of control over the agenda for student use of school facilities, preferring some subjects over others, without needing to identify so-called ‘compelling state interests.’”); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390 (“There is no
question that the District, like the private owner of property, may legally preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is dedicated.”); Good News Club, 533 U.S. at
106 (“When the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is not required to and does
not allow persons to engage in every type of speech. The State may be justified in reserving
its forum for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”).
135. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. 384.
136. See id. at 394 (quoting City Council of L.A. v. Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984)) (“The principle that has emerged from our cases ‘is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the
expense of others.’ That principle applies in the circumstances of this case.”).
137. Id. at 386.
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values.”138 “That subject matter,” the Court said, “[was] not one that the
District [had] placed off limits to any and all speakers.”139 Both the
church’s films and the speech allowed by other groups promoted the same
good—“the welfare of the community.” The only difference being that the
church’s films did so from a religious perspective.140
In Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia,141
the Court again applied an equal protection mode of analysis to vindicate
the free speech rights of a religious group. The Court held that the First
Amendment required the University of Virginia to fund a religious student
newspaper, called Wide Awake, out of the Student Activity Fund (the
SAF).142 “The purpose of the SAF,” said the Court, “is to support a broad
range of extracurricular student activities that are related to the educational
purpose of the University.”143 The University funded a wide gamut of student groups out of the SAF, including “student news, information, opinion,
entertainment, or academic communications media groups.”144 Just as in
Lamb’s Chapel, the Court’s decision rested on the parity between Wide
Awake’s proposed religious speech and the secular speech already permitted by the University. Wide Awake’s speech was “similarly situated” with
respect to “the educational purpose” of the SAF. The “subjects discussed”
by Wide Awake, said the Court, “were otherwise within the approved category of publications.”145 Wide Awake simply sought to address the subjects
from a religious perspective.
The Court once more relied on equal protection in Good News Club v.
Milford Central School District146 to analyze a religious speech claim. The
Court held that the First Amendment required a New York school district to
give classroom space to a Good News Club for its after-school meetings.147
138. Id. at 393.
139. Id.
140. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394
(1993) (“The film series involved here no doubt dealt with a subject otherwise permissible
under [the District’s rules], and its exhibition was denied solely because the series dealt with
the subject from a religious standpoint.”).
141. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
142. See id. at 837, 845-46 (“The viewpoint discrimination inherent in the University's regulation required public officials to scan and interpret student publications to discern
their underlying philosophic assumptions respecting religious theory and belief. That course
of action was a denial of the right of free speech and would risk fostering a pervasive bias or
hostility to religion.”).
143. Id. at 824.
144. Id. at 825.
145. Id. at 831.
146. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
147. See id. at 107 (“Concluding that Milford’s exclusion of the Good News Club
based on its religious nature is indistinguishable from the exclusions in these cases [that is
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The school district opened classrooms to community groups for the purpose
of promoting the “welfare of the community.” 148 The district allowed
groups, like the Boy Scouts and the 4H Club, to meet to “teach morals and
character development to children,”149 but denied meeting space to the
Good News Club to teach the same subjects from a religious perspective. 150
The Court once again rooted its decision in the similarity between the Good
News Club's proposed speech and the speech of the Boy Scouts and the 4H
Club already permitted by the district. “What matters for purposes of the
Free Speech Clause,” said the Court, “is that we can see no logical difference in kind between the invocation of Christianity by the Club and the
invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism by other associations to provide a foundation for their lessons.”151 The Club’s speech was “similarly
situated” to the already allowed speech—both furthered the district’s objective of promoting the “welfare of the community.”
Yet the Court has not always found that religious speech is “similarly
situated” to nonreligious speech. Most recently, the Court held in Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez152 that Hastings College of the Law could deny
classroom space, bulletin boards, and money to a religious student group, a
chapter of the Christian Legal Society (CLS), without transgressing the
Constitution.153 CLS required that voting members and leaders—the students who control the group—affirm their commitment to the group’s core
beliefs by signing a Statement of Faith.154 That was a problem for Hastings.
Hastings insisted that all student groups seeking recognition and its accompanying benefits must maintain an all-comers policy with regard to membership and leadership.155 “[I]n order to be a registered organization,” the
school said, “you have to allow all of our students to be members and full
participants if they want to.”156
the cases of Lamb’s Chapel and Rosenberger], we hold that the exclusion constitutes viewpoint discrimination.”).
148. Id. at 102 (observing that “the school is available for social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment events, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the
community, provided that such uses shall be nonexclusive and shall be opened to the general
public.”).
149. Id. at 108.
150. See id. (“Just as there is no question that teaching morals and character development to children is a permissible purpose under Milford’s policy, it is clear that the Club
teaches morals and character development to children.”).
151. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001).
152. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
153. See id. at 2978 (“[W]e reject CLS's First Amendment challenge . . . [and] we
hold, Hastings did not transgress constitutional limitations.”).
154. See id. at 2980.
155. See id. at 2979.
156. Id.
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The purpose of the all-comers policy, according to Hastings, was to
“ensure that leadership, educational, and social opportunities afforded by
registered student groups are available to all students.”157 The nonreligious
student groups already recognized by Hastings complied with the policy.
They had agreed to “allow any student to participate, become a member, or
seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless of [the student’s]
status or beliefs.”158 CLS had not. It “exclude[d] students who [held] religious convictions different from those in the Statement of Faith.”159 It could
not claim to be “similarly situated” to the already-recognized groups “with
respect to the purpose of the law.”160 It did not make its “opportunities . . .
available to all students.”161 Thus, as the Court put it, CLS’s “argument
stumble[d] from its first step.”162
Equal protection principles undergirded each of the Court’s “equal access” decisions. The central question—although cast in free speech terms—
was whether the proposed religious speech was “similarly situated” to the
speech already permitted by the government.

IV. THE RELIGIOUS WORSHIP CASES
An estimated 24,000 churches meet in public and charter school spaces for Sunday morning worship.163 And all ten of the largest school districts
in the country report they grant “permits for religious congregations to hold
weekend worship.”164 Most of these churches meet week after week without
problem. However, in the last five to ten years, a handful of school districts
have refused to continue renting space to churches. Most notably, in 2012,
New York City Public Schools evicted about 160 congregations that used
school buildings for worship services.165
Churches and their lawyers challenged these evictions as denials of
equal access. As established above, equal access is at root an equal protection argument—that because the proposed religious speech is “similarly
situated” to the nonreligious speech already allowed by the government, the
government should treat the religious speech in a like manner. That is, that
157. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3014 (2010).
158. Id. at 2979.
159. Id. at 2980.
160. See id. at 2994 (“An all-comers condition on access to RSO status, in short, is
textbook viewpoint neutral.”).
161. Id. at 3014.
162. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3014 (2010).
163. See Cathy Lynn Grossman & Natalie DiBlasio, “Instant Churches” Convert
Public Schools to Worship Spaces, USA TODAY, perma.cc/L44L-52JU.
164. Id.
165. See Sharon Otterman, Churches to Lose Use of School Space After a Legal Push
Fails, N.Y. TIMES, December 6, 2011, at A20.
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the government should extend religious speakers the same access to benefits, such as classrooms, corkboards, and money that it already extends to
nonreligious speakers.
That means that for the churches’ equal access argument to work, they
must prove that the government already plays host to “equivalent secular
speech.”166 In fact, a church’s equal access argument does not even get out
of the gate unless it can prove that its worship service is “similarly situated”
to the secular speech the government presently allows. And that is the trouble. “Christian worship,” said the noted Swiss theologian Karl Barth, “is the
most momentous, the most urgent, the most glorious action that can take
place in human life.”167 Christian worship is singular; it has no “secular
equivalent.” It cannot be forced into the mold of equal access.
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to consider the constitutionality of the
government’s decision to deny school space to churches and their congregants to assemble for worship. But three lower federal courts—the Second,
the Seventh, and the Ninth Circuits—have already taken up the issue. None
have been particularly receptive to the churches’ equal access argument.
A.

BRONX HOUSEHOLD OF FAITH V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

The most high profile case happened in New York City. 168 The dispute
involved the Bronx Household of Faith—an evangelical Christian church
seeking to use public school space for its Sunday morning worship services.
The church said in its application to the school board that it planned to use
the facilities “for its Sunday morning ‘church service[s].’”169 According to
the church, its services included “singing of Christian hymns and songs,
prayer, fellowship with other church members and Biblical preaching and
teaching, communion, and sharing of testimonies.”170 The city turned the
church down based on its policy that prohibited the use of school space for

166. Badger Catholic, Inc., v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775,778 (2010) (citing Rosenberger v.
Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-30 (1995)). See also University's
Distribution of Activity Fees to Student Group Engaging in Religious Speech, Walsh v.
Badger Catholic, Inc., U.S. SUP. CT. ACTIONS 8 No. 10-731 (Mar. 18, 2011) (observing that
“withholding support of religious speech, when equivalent secular speech was funded,
would be a form of forbidden viewpoint discrimination”) (emphasis added).
167. JOHN GAGE ALLEE, WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DICTIONARIES 432 (Ottenheimer Publishers 1958).
168. See. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 32-34 (2d Cir.
2011) (Bronx Household IV).
169. Id. at 33 (alteration in original).
170. Id.
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“religious worship services, or otherwise using a school as a house of worship.”171
The church sued and argued that the school board’s rejection violated
the First Amendment principle of equal access.172 It claimed that the school
board having opened its facilities to “social, civic and recreational meetings
and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community” had to also open up its facilities to Christian worship.173 The school
board allowed secular groups, like the Scouts and the Legionnaire Cadets,
to use school space to teach morals and character, so the board must allow
the church to do the same.174 The church contended that these “secular
groups did all the same expressive activities that the church did in its Sunday morning meetings, such as singing, teaching, and including a secular
version of ceremony and ritual for the same purposes, to teach morals and
character.”175 Thus, argued the church, for the school board to deny the
church’s application to use school facilities for religious worship constituted impermissible “viewpoint discrimination.”176
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. The court distinguished the Supreme Court’s equal access precedents, such as Lamb’s
Chapel, Good News Club, and Rosenberger,177 as resting on the fact that the
proposed religious speech was “similarly situated” to the speech already
171. Id. at 34-35. The full text of the city’s policy on use of school space for religious
worship says:
No permit shall be granted for the purpose of holding religious
worship services, or otherwise using a school as a house of
worship. Permits may be granted to religious clubs for students
that are sponsored by outside organizations and otherwise satisfy the requirements of this chapter on the same basis that
they are granted to other clubs for students that are sponsored
by outside organizations.
Id. at 35 n.4 (quoting NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE
§ 5.11).
172. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 2011)
(Bronx Household IV).
173. Id. at 33, 38-39 (considering argument that “because the [City’s] rule prohibits
use of facilities for “religious worship services,” it excludes religious worship services while
permitting non-religious worship services.”).
174. See Brief for Appellees at 25, Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650
F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 07–5291), 2008 WL 8605839, at *25.
175. See id.
176. See id. at *24 (“The Board engages in viewpoint discrimination that the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in Good News Club by allowing groups to meet to
teach morals and character, as long as it they do not do so from a religious perspective.”).
177. See Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d at 39 (“The application of [the Board’s policy] to deny Bronx Household’s request to use school facilities for worship services is thus in
no way incompatible with the Supreme Court's decisions in Good News Club, Lamb’s Chapel, and Rosenberger.”).
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allowed by the schools.178 The religious groups’ expressions were in every
way equivalent to the speech already permitted by the government, except
for the groups’ religious viewpoint.
In Lamb’s Chapel, for instance, a church seeking to show a Christian
film series on childrearing was “similarly situated” to the community
groups already discussing childrearing. All that distinguished it from these
community groups was its religious perspective.179 In Good News Club, the
club was “similarly situated” to the groups, like the Boy Scouts and 4H
Club, which taught children about character and patriotism. The only difference was the club’s religious perspective.180 In Rosenberger, Wide
Awake magazine was “similarly situated” to the other school-funded publications. Like the other magazines and newspapers, it sought to address current political and social issues. It simply sought to do so from a religious
perspective.181
The Second Circuit said:
Here, by contrast, there is no restraint on the free
expression of any point of view. Expression of all
points of view is permitted. The exclusion applies
only to the conduct of a certain type of activity—
the conduct of worship services—and not to the
free expression of religious views associated with
it.182

178. See id. at 38 (“Nor is this rule of exclusion vulnerable on the ground that the
activity excluded [religious worship] has some similarities to another activity that is allowed.
… [W]e reject the suggestion that because a religious worship service shares some features
with activities such as a Boy Scout meeting, no meaningful distinction can be drawn between the two types of activities.”).
179. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394
(1993) (“The film series involved here no doubt dealt with a subject otherwise permissible
under Rule 10, and its exhibition was denied solely because the series dealt with the subject
from a religious standpoint.”).
180. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 108 (2011) (“Just as
there is no question that teaching morals and character development to children is a permissible purpose under Milford’s policy, it is clear that the Club teaches morals and character
development to children. . . . Nonetheless, because Milford found the Club’s activities to be
religious in nature, . . . it excluded the Club from use of its facilities.”).
181. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 831 (1995)
(“By the very terms of the SAF prohibition, the University . . . selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints. Religion may be a
vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a
standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered. The prohibited
perspective . . . resulted in the refusal to make third-party payments, for the subjects discussed were otherwise within the approved category of publications.”).
182. Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d at 39.
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Bronx Household’s religious worship, thus, was different. It was not
just a religious perspective on the teaching, singing, and ritual already being
done by the Scouts and the Legionnaire. “There is no real secular analogue
to religious ‘services,’ such that a ban on religious services might pose a
substantial threat of viewpoint discrimination between religion and secularism.”183 To argue that the church’s worship services were “similarly situated” to a supposed category of “non-religious worship services,” the court
said, was a “canard.”184
There is no difference in usage between a “worship
service” and a “religious worship service;” both refer to a service of religious worship. We think,
with confidence, that if 100 randomly selected
people were polled as to whether they attend “worship services,” all of them would understand the
questioner to be inquiring whether they attended
services of religious worship. While it is true that
the word “worship” is occasionally used in nonreligious contexts, such as to describe a miser, who is
said to “worship” money, or a fan who “worships”
a movie star, the term “worship services” has no
similar use; meetings of a celebrity’s fan club are
not described as “worship services.” Worship services are religious; the rule describes the entire category of activity excluded. The meaning of the
rule's exclusion of “religious worship services”
would be no different if it identified the excluded
activity as “worship services.”185
A worship service is sui generis. “It is,” as Judge Calabresi put it,
“something entirely different.”186 New York City’s exclusion of worship
services, said the court, “does not constitute viewpoint discrimination.”187
Unlike Lamb’s Chapel, Good News Club, and Rosenberger, the exclusion
applies only to the conduct of a certain type of activity—the conduct of
religious worship services—and not to the free expression of religious
183. Id. at 38 (quoting Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127
F.3d 207, 221 (2d Cir. 1997) (Cabranes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) [hereinafter Bronx Household I]).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 51 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
187. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2011)
(Bronx Household IV).
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views on an otherwise secular subject.188 A worship service by its very nature is not “similarly situated” to any other speech allowed by the city.
B.

FAITH CENTER CHURCH EVANGELISTIC MINISTRIES V.
GLOVER

The factual setup in Faith Center Church189 parallels that of Bronx
Household of Faith. It too involved “an evangelical Christian church seeking access to [government facilities] to conduct . . . religious worship services.”190 The Antioch Branch Library in Contra Costa County, California
opened its “meeting rooms for educational, cultural and community related
meetings, programs and activities.”191 The Faith Center Church submitted
applications “requesting to use the . . . Antioch Branch Library meeting
room.”192 In its applications, the church described the purpose of its meetings as “prayer, praise, and worship.”193 The library approved the church’s
application to use a meeting room for a seminar on learning to pray, but
denied its application to hold a formal worship service.194 The library relied
on a “Religious Use” policy, which prohibited “religious services” from
being conducted in library meeting rooms.195
The church sued and argued that the library must provide it “equal access to use library meeting rooms.”196 According to the church, its worship
services were no different than meetings already allowed by the library.
Every part of its worship service, the church contended, had a “secular
equivalent” the library had previously okayed.197 The church’s hymns and
praise songs were no different than the Boy Scouts “singing a secular
song,” like “America, the Beautiful” or “Home on the Range.”198 The sermons preached by the church’s pastor were no different than “the Demo188. See id. at 39.
189. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891 (9th Cir.
2006).
190. Id. at 902.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 903.
193. Id. at 906. The church’s pastor described “the purpose of Faith Center’s meetings as ‘Prayer, Praise and Worship Open to the Public, Purpose to Teach and Encourage
Salvation thru Jesus Christ and Build up Community.’” Id. at 903 (quoting Faith Center’s
building use applications).
194. See Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 904 (9th
Cir. 2006).
195. Id.
196. See Brief for Appellees at 12, Faith Center Church v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891 (9th
Cir. 2006) (No. 05–16132), 2005 WL 4155339, at *12.
197. Id. at *20.
198. Id.
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cratic Club discussing community issues in a political speech.”199 And even
its prayers, the church argued, were no different than Narcotics Anonymous
pleading with addicts to stop taking drugs.200
The Ninth Circuit took issue. “[W]e disagree that prohibiting religious
worship services in the Antioch Library meeting room constitutes viewpoint discrimination.”201 The equal access cases, like Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News Club, turned on the fact “the government ha[d]
excluded a perspective on a subject matter otherwise permitted in the forum.”202 The government had prohibited speech that, other than being spoken from a religious perspective, was similarly situated to the speech it already allowed. “[T]he focus,” said the court, “was on whether some other
group had been permitted to engage in the same kind of speech activity
from a perspective other than the prohibited [religious] one.”203
That kind of discrimination, according to the court, was not what the
Antioch Branch Library had done. “[R]eligious worship,” the court said, “is
not a secular activity that conveys a religious viewpoint on otherwise permissible subject matter.”204
Religious worship . . . is not a viewpoint but a category of discussion within which many different
religious perspectives abound. If the County had,
for example, excluded from its forum religious
worship services by Mennonites, then we would
conclude that the County had engaged in unlawful
viewpoint discrimination against the Mennonite religion. But a blanket exclusion of religious worship
services from the forum is one based on the content
of speech.205
The Antioch Library excluded Faith Center’s worship service because
worship “was too tenuously associated to the forum’s purpose.”206 Faith
Center sought to “occup[y] the Antioch forum expressly for ‘praise and
199. Id.
200. Brief for Appellees at 20, Faith Center Church v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891 (9th Cir.
2006) (No. 05–16132), 2005 WL 4155339, at *20.
201. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 914 (9th Cir.
2006).
202. Id. See also id. at 912 (“The test is whether the government has excluded perspectives on a subject matter otherwise permitted by the forum.”).
203. Id. at 913.
204. Id. at 915.
205. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 915 (9th Cir.
2006).
206. Id. at 915 n.14.
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worship’ and in doing so Faith Center exceeded the boundaries of the library’s limited forum.”207 The church’s worship did not further the forum’s
purpose—“to encourage the use of library meeting rooms for educational,
cultural and community related meetings, programs and activities”—in the
same manner as the speech already allowed by the library.208 It was not
similarly situated with regard to the purpose of the forum. The Democratic
Club’s political speeches, the Narcotics Anonymous’s recovery meetings,
and the Boy Scouts’ pack meetings were inapposite.209 Religious worship,
as Judge Karlton put it, “is categorically different.”210
C.

BADGER CATHOLIC V. WALSH

The Seventh Circuit in Badger Catholic v. Walsh211 reached an opposite result to that of the Second and Ninth Circuits. The University of Wisconsin at Madison regularly doled out money to student groups to promote
their activities.212 Badger Catholic, a religious student group, applied to the
University for money to cover expenses related to hosting Catholic masses
and “praise and worship programs.”213 The University refused to reimburse
the group’s expenses based on a policy of not “pay[ing] for three categories
207. Id. at 915.
208. Id. at 902, 915.
209. See id. at 914-15.
210. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 919 (9th Cir.
2006) (Karlton, J., concurring). The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the Antioch Library’s
exclusion of Faith Center’s worship services was reasonable. The court said:
By the same token, the County’s decision to exclude Faith
Center’s religious worship services from the meeting room is
reasonable in light of the library policy so that the Antioch forum is not transformed into an occasional house of worship.
Faith Center acknowledges that it seeks to reach out to those
individuals who might not enter a traditional church building,
and to bring the evangelical church experience to them. We
see nothing wrong with the County excluding certain subject
matter or activities that it deems inconsistent with the forum's
purpose, so long as the County does not discriminate against a
speaker's viewpoint. To conclude that the County’s exclusion
of religious worship services from its government buildings is
unreasonable would result in the “remarkable proposition that
any public building opened for civic meetings must be opened
for use as a church, synagogue, or mosque.”
Id. at 910-11 (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 139 (2011)
(Souter, J., dissenting)).
211. Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2010).
212. See id. at 776.
213. See id. at 776-77; see also Roman Catholic Found. v. Regents of the Univ. of
Wis. Sys., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1088-89 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (listing the student group’s
events for which the University denied funding).
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of speech: worship, proselytizing, and religious instruction.”214 Badger
Catholic sued and argued equal access—“that the University must reimburse Badger Catholic’s activities on the same basis as it reimburses other
student groups.”215 The University violated equal access when it gave money to a student group aimed at “worshiping the New York Yankees,” but
refused to give money “if you’re worshiping God.”216 In other words, because Badger Catholic’s religious worship was similarly situated to other
forms of so-called “worship,” like cheering for a sports team, the University
had to treat Badger Catholic’s masses and worship programs equally.
The Seventh Circuit sided with Badger Catholic. “[W]ithholding support of religious speech when equivalent secular speech is funded,” the
court said, “is a form of forbidden viewpoint discrimination.”217 It is the
very definition of treating similarly situated speech differently. But the
court said that, under other circumstances, the University likely could exclude the category of “worship” from funding. “[C]ontent discrimination,”
said the court, “can be part of a lawful system of allocating limited funds; . .
. if the content of the speech would place it outside the scope of the program.”218 But the dilemma here was that the University could not meaningfully separate out which of Badger Catholic’s activities constituted “worship” without impermissibly entangling itself in religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause.219 “The problem . . . with excluding worship as a
category of speech from its forum would lie in how the University and its
fund administrators decide which activities constitute ‘purely religious activity’ and which activities use a religious perspective to approach a more
generally accessible purpose.”220 Such University scrutiny of the Badger
Catholic’s activities, the court said, raised the “specter of inevitable government entanglement.”221
214. See id. at 777.
215. Id.
216. Transcript of Oral Argument, Badger Catholic v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775 (7th Cir.
2010) (No. 09-1102), 2009 WL 3762863.
217. Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 778. The court held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
equal access line of cases—in particular, Widmar and Rosenberger—“dispose[d] of the
University’s contention that, in refusing to fund Badger Catholic's proposed activities, it did
not engage in “viewpoint discrimination.” Id. at 779.
218. Id. The court said “one example” would be “[a] university can decline to pay for
an art historian to address a conference devoted to public transit, because the art historian’s
perspective is outside the scope of the conference.”’Id.
219. See id. at 777 (stating that Badger Catholic’s worship activities could not meaningfully be distinguished “from the categories of ‘dialog, discussion or debate from a religious perspective’ funded by the University.”).
220. Badger Catholic v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 787 (7th Cir. 2010) (Williams, J.,
dissenting).
221. Id. (citing Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891,
918 n.18 (9th Cir. 2006)).
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The Seventh Circuit’s entanglement concerns are consistent with the
U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Widmar v. Vincent.222 There, the Court
considered that “religious worship” might not be “speech generally protected by the ‘free speech’ guarantee of the First Amendment and the ‘equal
protection’ guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.”223 It reasoned that
“[i]f religious worship were protected speech, . . . the Religion Clauses
would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which
religious practice took the form of speech.”224 But the Court thought the
University of Missouri at Kansas City lacked the constitutional competence
to distinguish between which of Cornerstone’s activities were “religious
worship” and which were simply speech tackling issues and debates from a
religious perspective.225
Merely to draw the distinction would require the
university—and ultimately the courts—to inquire
into the significance of words and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a
manner forbidden by our cases.226
The Supreme Court thus recognized that the government might in certain cases permissibly segregate out worship.227 But Widmar was not that
case. The University could not determine which of Cornerstone’s activities
constituted worship without an unacceptable risk of entanglement.228
The same risk of entanglement existed in Badger Catholic. The student group’s masses and worship programs were just small portions of larger activities hosted by the group—“four-day retreats,” “leadership training,”
“spiritual mentoring/counseling,” and the like.229 When Badger Catholic
applied to the University for funding, it did not parse out which part of its
activities were religious worship and which were simply speech with a religious perspective.230 The onus was on the University to make that determination. But just as in Widmar, for the University to make such a judgment

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
Id. at 269 n.6.
Id.
See id. at 272 n.11.
Id. at 269 n.6.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
Id. at 273.
Badger Catholic v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 2010).
See id.
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“would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by [the Supreme Court’s] cases.”231
In contrast, in Bronx Household and Faith Center Church, the churches themselves identified their activities as religious worship in their rental
applications.232 Neither the City of New York nor the Antioch County Library had to scrutinize and categorize the churches’ activities. They took
the churches at their word and, thus, avoided meddling with the churches’
religious beliefs and practices in a manner that inevitably would have entangled them with religion.
The Second Circuit in Bronx Household233 specifically considered the
argument that “any attempt by the Board to distinguish between religious
activity that falls under the exclusion of ‘worship services,’ and religious
activity that does not, necessarily places the Board in violation of the duty
imposed by Lemon to avoid ‘excessive government entanglement with religion.’”234 The court acknowledged that, “without doubt, there are circumstances where a government official’s involvement in matters of religious
doctrine constitutes excessive government entanglement.”235 But the City’s
refusal to allow Bronx Household to use a school as a house of worship was
not such a circumstance. “[W]hatever merit this argument may have in other types of cases, we do not see what application it has here. Bronx Household does not contest that it conducts religious worship services. To the
contrary, it applied for a permit to conduct ‘Christian worship services,’ and
the evidence suggests no reason to question its own characterization of its
activities.”236
The Ninth Circuit reasoned similarly in Faith Center Church.237 The
court considered the church’s argument that “religious worship cannot be
distinguished from other permissible forms of religious speech. According
to Faith Center, to enforce such a distinction, would entangle the government with religion in a manner forbidden by the Establishment Clause.” 238
The court conceded that “[t]he distinction to be drawn here . . . —one be231. See id. at 779; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6.
232. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“Bronx Household applied to use [school facilities] under the new rule, stating in its application that it planned to use the facilities for ‘Christian worship services,’ and the Board
denied the application.”); see also Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480
F.3d 891, 903 (9th Cir. 2006) (“In each application, Pastor Hopkins described the purpose of
Faith Center's meetings as ‘Prayer, Praise and Worship Open to the Public, Purpose to Teach
and Encourage Salvation thru Jesus Christ and Build up Community.’”).
233. Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d 30.
234. Id. at 46.
235. Id. at 47.
236. Id.
237. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries, 480 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2006).
238. Id. at 916.
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tween religious worship and virtually all other forms of religious speech—
[is] one that the government and the courts are not competent to make.”239
But, according to the court, the library did not have to make the distinction.
“That distinction . . . was already made by Faith Center itself when it separated its afternoon religious worship service from its morning activities.
Faith Center admits that it occupied the Antioch forum in the afternoon of
May 29, 2004 expressly for ‘praise and worship.’”240 The court concluded
that “[t]he County may not be able to identify whether Faith Center has
engaged in pure religious worship, but Faith Center can and did.”241
These religious worship cases are consistent with the equal protection
underpinnings of the First Amendment doctrine of equal access. The cases
recognize that, while the government has a general obligation to treat religious and nonreligious speech evenhandedly, it can exclude speech that is
not “similarly situated” to the speech already being allowed by the government. The Second, Ninth, and Seventh Circuits all held that religious worship fell within this exception. Worship could be excluded by the government, because it was not “similarly situated” to any other speech. It had no
“secular equivalent.”
The Seventh Circuit in Badger Catholic nonetheless held that the University of Wisconsin ran afoul of the First Amendment by denying a Catholic group funding for activities that included a worship component.242 But
the court did so, only because the University could not separate out the
group’s worship activities without impermissibly entangling itself with religion.243 In the typical religious worship case, like Faith Center Church or
Bronx Household, there is no real threat of entanglement.244 The churches
themselves identify their activities as worship. The government merely accepts the churches’ own classification of its activities.

V. WHY DOES ANY OF THIS MATTER?
Christian lawyers continue to push the notion of “a church’s right to
have equal access to government facilities.”245 “From the very beginning of
the United States,” they argue, “churches have used government facilities
239. Id. at 918.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Badger Catholic v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 780-81 (7th Cir. 2010).
243. See id.
244. See Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 903 (9th
Cir. 2006); Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2011) (Bronx
Household IV).
245. Erik Stanley, Churches and Government Facilities: A Battleground for the
Gospel, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM BLOG (April 28, 2014), perma.cc/P592-XZ9F.
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for worship services.”246 But such an argument ignores the equal protection
roots of the First Amendment doctrine of equal access. By arguing religious
worship cases under the rubric of “equal access,” Christian lawyers necessarily equate religious worship with the secular speech already allowed by
the government. That is problematic for three reasons: (1) it guts worship of
its distinct, spiritual character, (2) it weakens churches’ ability to rely on the
specialness of religion as a reason for constitutional protection in the future,
and (3) it lacks integrity.
A.

GUTTING RELIGIOUS WORSHIP

Framing religious worship cases as equal access cases may work in the
short term. It did in Badger Catholic.247 But long term, it will hurt religious
worship. Worship does not fit the mold of Lamb’s Chapel, Good News
Club, and Rosenberger. Each of those cases depended on the proposed religious speech—whether showing a video series from a religious perspective,
teaching character from religious perspective, or publishing a newspaper
from a religious perspective—being “similarly situated” to the secular
speech already permitted by the government. The government already allowed speakers to use classroom space to speak on childrearing, character,
and current events. Endeavors to speak on those subjects from religious
groups were “similarly situated” in every sense except for their religious
perspectives. The religious groups’ speech in these cases furthered the government’s purpose—promoting the welfare of the community, fostering
academic debate on campus, etc.—just the same as the nonreligious groups’
speech. It brought a religious perspective on a subject the government had
already chosen for discussion.
But the same cannot be said of religious worship. It is not just a religious perspective on a subject already allowed by the government. Nor does
it further the purpose of why the government rents out its facilities in the
first place. The purpose of a religious worship service is not to promote the
community welfare or to foster academic debate. Rather, when the church
gathers for worship, it “blesses the Father by her worship, praise, and
thanksgiving and begs him for the gift of his Son and the Holy Spirit.”248
The aim of worship is transcendent. It is nothing less than to glorify God.

246. Id.
247. But recall that it worked only because the University of Wisconsin lacked the
constitutional competence to dissect the religious student group’s activities. It could not
determine what portion of its activities constituted worship and what portion constituted
mere speech from a religious a perspective without impermissibly entangling itself with
religion. See Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d at 787 (Williams, J., dissenting).
248. COMPENDIUM OF THE CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 67, Q. 221 (2009).
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The character of true, Christian worship is such that it can never be
deemed “similarly situated” to any form of secular speech. As the Second
Circuit said, worship has no “secular analogue.”249 It is a personal encounter with God, which no secular activity could ever claim to be.
Worship is a love affair! It is the most thrilling and
heartwarming activity of the mind and heart that
can be conceived: the personal encounter of the
creature with its Creator, the soul with its Savior,
the man with his Master. Worship is the renewing
of a daily kinship and fellowship with Jesus Christ.
. . . When we worship we mend and straighten our
spiritual fences; we lift our lives up the very Light
of Light. Worship is a blessing, refreshing interchange between a man and his Lord.250
Religious worship is nonsense to the unbeliever. The Apostle Paul
says it is “folly to those who are perishing.”251 “The natural person,” said
Paul, “does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to
him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned.”252 Christian worship then is foreign and perhaps even odd to the
watching world.
It is true that in some sense the school booster club “worships” the
basketball team, the school cheerleaders “worship” the football team, or the
marching band “worships” at the school pep rally. But this so-called “worship” is in no sense “similarly situated” to Christian worship. When the
Prophet Isaiah came into the presence of the Almighty God and worshipped, he fell on his face and cried, “Woe is me! For I am lost; for I am a
man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for
my eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts!”253 Rarely is anyone so
249. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 2011)
(Bronx Household IV).
250. SHERWOOD WIRT, A THIRST FOR GOD 130 (Zondervan 1980). A.W. Tozer put it
this way:
To worship is to feel in your heart and express in some appropriate manner a humbling but delightful sense of admiring awe
and astonished wonder and overpowering love in the presence
of that most ancient Mystery, that Majesty which philosophers
call the First Cause, but which we call Our Father Which Art
in Heaven.
James Snyder, A.W. Tozer: A Heart to Worship, A.W. TOZER CLASSICS,
http://www.awtozerclassics.com/articles/article/4891846/86018.htm.
251. 1 Corinthians 1:18 (English Standard).
252. 1 Corinthians 2:14 (English Standard).
253. Isaiah 6:5 (English Standard).
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“lost” and anguished by the local high school football team—no matter how
dreamy the quarterback may be. The sacredness of the worship of God, the
Creator of the Universe, cannot with any sincerity and right reverence, be
equated to cheering for the school football team.
When the local church body comes together for worship, it is joined to
the action of Christ, “the high point both of the action by which God sanctifies the world in Christ and of the worship that the human race offers to the
Father, adoring him through Christ, the Son of God, in the Holy Spirit.”254
When the church assembles for worship she is not
at all like the world. She invokes the name of
Christ. She prays and sings to a God who cannot be
seen. She hears words said by a man commissioned
by Christ that become, by the work of the Holy
Spirit, the power of God unto salvation. She eats a
holy meal whose portions are tiny, but which, by
the blessing of Christ, nourishes God's people for
eternal life. In these ways the church at worship is
different from the world. All elements of worship
look weak and foolish to those outside the house of
God. But to God's people they are manna that sustains for eternal life.255
Stripping worship of its spiritual character may be pragmatic; it may
even help churches gain access to public school buildings. But at what cost?
Without the spiritual trappings, perhaps churches will have an easier time
equating worship with the everyday, nonreligious speech already allowed in
government-run facilities. But what is left can hardly be called worship.
Ultimately, is worship really worship at all if it lacks any sense of coming
into the presence of the transcendent God of the Universe?
In the past, Christians roundly criticized attempts to “secularize”
Christianity as a mere tool to get from point A to point B. In the mid-1800s,
for instance, Horace Mann, Alexander Campbell, and William Ruffner
pushed the teaching of a stripped down concept of Christianity in public
schools as a means to create a virtuous citizenry for “easy” governing.
Churches protested the government “turn[ing] the Jesus of [the] faith into a
model citizen, a figure several steps removed from the revered second person of the [t]rinity.”256
254. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, General Instructions of the Roman Missal, no. 16, perma.cc/7U3N-FKVE.
255. D.G. HART AND JOHN R. MUETHER, WITH REVERENCE AND AWE 34 (P & R Publishing 2002).
256. D. G. HART, A SECULAR FAITH 77-83 (2006).
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In particular, when Boston public schools called for students to recite
the Ten Commandments as part of their daily religious instruction, the local
Roman Catholic Bishop objected that Catholic students could not “present
[themselves] before the Divine presence in what would be for [Catholics] a
merely simulated union of prayer and adoration.”257 In other words, “what
for Boston’s public school officials and teachers was simply a generic, unobjectionable reading from an age-old source of Christian morality, to Roman Catholics was an act of religious devotion that needed to be performed
in a setting properly reserved for worship.”258 The Church would not stand
for separating Christian morality from Christian spirituality in the hope of
teaching Americans “the morality necessary for a republican form of government.”259
The temptation even now to divorce the Christian faith from Christian
spirituality in the name of expediency remains the same. It would certainly
be easier to rent space for Sunday morning worship in government-run
buildings by just downplaying the unique, spiritual elements of Christianity.
But Christians rejected such a utilitarian approach to religion in the past;
they should do so again. Christians cannot call religious worship “similarly
situated” to everyday, ordinary speech without quelling what makes it distinct and sacred. That frankly would not be worship at all.
B.

UNDERVALUING THE SPECIALNESS OF RELIGION

The churches’ equal access argument, as the name itself suggests, emphasizes the “equality” of religious worship to the nonreligious speech already allowed by the government. But it does so, at the expenses of the
“specialness” of worship. It maintains that religious worship is protected
because of its sameness, rather than because of its uniqueness. That praying
the Lord’s Prayer is a religious version of the Scout Oath. That singing
hymns and spiritual songs is a spiritualized school cheer. That preaching the
Word of God is a churchly political speech. The religious and nonreligious
expression, the argument goes, are equal and for the government to treat
them differently is impermissible discrimination.
But here is the rub. Sometimes religious expression cannot be protected based on an equality rationale. Under an equality rationale, what happens to the Amish family who does not want to send their kids to public
school?260 Equality means the Amish family complies with compulsory
257. Id. at 82.
258. Id. at 83-84.
259. Id. at 78.
260. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (considering whether the State of
Wisconsin could compel Amish families to send their children to public high school contrary
to their religious beliefs).
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school attendance laws just like any other family. Or what about the Christian business owner who does not want to pay for abortifacients?261 Equality means the business owner pays for abortifacients like any other business
owner in the United States. Or the Seventh-Day Adventist who needs unemployment benefits but does not want to work on the Sabbath?262 Equality
means they only qualify for unemployment benefits if they are willing to
work on Saturdays like every other applicant for benefits. Or the Jehovah’s
Witness who does not want to salute the American flag? 263 Equality means
she pays homage to the flag just like any other public school student. In
each case, the equality rationale fails to protect the religious expression.
Only an acknowledgement of the specialness of religion justifies protecting religious expression in these cases. That unlike the political beliefs
and social values of groups like the Sierra Club or the Federalist Society,
the religious beliefs of churches and their adherents “involve[] something
transcendent, objective, normative, and exclusive.”264 Religion makes
claims on its adherents that supersede those of the government. When the
claims of religion and the laws of government conflict, the government
generally must yield.
The reality of God . . . was an essential premise
underlying the arguments for religious freedom
during the colonial and founding periods. . . . Religious freedom only made sense because God exists: God makes claims on human beings; these
claims are prior to and superior to the claims of the
state; the individual’s response to God’s claims, to
be genuine, must be voluntary and not coerced; the
state must not attempt to define or regulate the relationship between God and the individual and ordinarily must yield to the claims of God as articulated by the sincere believer.265

261. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (considering
whether Christian-owned businesses must provide health insurance coverage of abortifacients contrary to their religious beliefs).
262. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (considering whether Seventh Day
Adventist must agree to work on the Sabbath contrary to her religious beliefs to qualify for
unemployment benefits).
263. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (considering
whether Jehovah’s Witness students must pledge allegiance to the American flag contrary to
their religious beliefs).
264. E. Gregory Wallace, Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition, 114
PENN ST. L. REV. 485, 491 (2009).
265. Id. at 491-92.
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In other words, it is only the “specialness” of religion—that unlike any
other type of belief, religious beliefs are rooted in the transcendent reality
of a higher power—that justifies protecting religious expression when an
equality rationale will not.
Thus, the Supreme Court exempted the Amish from Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance laws because their decision to take their children
out of public school was “not merely a matter of personal preference, but
one of deep religious conviction.”266 The Court exempted the owners of
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialties from having to pay for
abortifacients for their employees because “the HHS mandate demands that
they engage in conduct that seriously violates” their “sincere religious belief that life begins at conception,” rather than just “the challengers’ views
on a secular issue.”267 The Court exempted the Seventh-Day Adventist from
the requirement that she be willing to work on Saturdays as a condition of
receiving unemployment benefits, because the requirement interfered with
her “religious convictions respecting the day of rest”268 and not merely her
“indolence” or “compulsive desire to watch the Saturday television programs.”269 The Court exempted the Jehovah’s Witnesses from the flag ceremony because their objection stemmed from a religious belief that saluting
flags constitutes worshipping a “graven image” in contravention of the Second Commandment270 and not from “any desire to show disrespect for either the flag or the country.”271
In each case, it was the religious nature of the beliefs that justified extending constitutional protections. Because the beliefs were rooted in religion—and therefore “superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government”272—they were worthy of protection. It had nothing to do with the
similarity or dissimilarity of the religious beliefs to any secular social beliefs.
Pushing religious worship cases like Bronx Household, Faith Center
Church, and Badger Catholic as equal access cases downplays the specialness of religion. The churches argue that their religious worship should be
protected not because of its specialness but because of the exact opposite—
its sameness to the secular expression already allowed by the government.
The equal access line of cases on which the churches rely epitomizes
the equality rationale for protection of religious expression. From the very
inception of equal access, the Supreme Court rejected the specialness of
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2755, 2775, 2779 (2014).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
Id. at 415 (Stewart, J., concurring).
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943).
Id. at 643 (Black, J., concurring).
Id. at 629.
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religion as the ground on which to protect religious student groups. In
Widmar,273 the religious student group, Cornerstone, argued that the University’s denial of access “violated their rights to free exercise of religion.”274 But the Supreme Court declined to “inquire into the extent, if any,
to which free exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University
regulation.”275 Rather, the Court ruled for Cornerstone based on “the right
of religious speakers to use public forums on equal terms with others.”276
The Court very purposely adopted an equality rationale over a specialness
rationale for protection of religious expression. In Lamb’s Chapel,277 the
Court reasoned similarly. Like Cornerstone, the church raised a free exercise claim.278 The Court ignored this claim and considered only “whether
[the school district] discriminates on the basis of viewpoint to permit [its]
property to be used for the presentation of all views about family issues and
child rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from a religious
standpoint.”279 The Court held that the school district had to give the religious viewpoint equal treatment. The Court again chose the equality rationale over the specialness rationale. The Court followed the same rationale in Rosenberger.280 The students “alleged that refusal to authorize
payment of the printing costs of the publication, solely on the basis of its
religious editorial viewpoint, violated,” among other things, “their rights . .
. to the free exercise of religion.”281 The Court ignored this claim and considered only whether the University of Virginia was “allowing religious
adherents to participate on equal terms” with the other student publications
in its funding program.282 The equivalency of religion to other viewpoints,
not its specialness, controlled. “[T]he neutrality commanded of the State by
the separate Clauses of the First Amendment,” the Court concluded, “was
compromised by the University’s course of action.”283 Thus, by its very
273. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
274. Id. at 266 (the student group also argued that the university’s actions ran afoul
of the group’s equal protection, free speech, and associational rights).
275. Id. 273 n.13 (“Respondents’ claim also implicates First Amendment rights of
speech and association, and it is on the bases of speech and association rights that we decide
the case.”).
276. Id. at 272 n.12.
277. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
278. See id. at 389.
279. Id. at 393.
280. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
281. Id. at 827.
282. Id. at 852-53 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also id. at 839 (admonishing that the
First Amendment mandates that the government must, “following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extend[] benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including
religious ones, are broad and diverse.”).
283. Id. at 845.
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nature, an equal access claim emphasizes equality at the expense of specialness.
Over time, this continued emphasis on equality will make it more difficult for churches to argue the specialness of religion as a ground for
providing constitutional protection. The more churches argue that they
should have access to public spaces for worship services because of the
similarity of their worship to secular expression, the harder it will be to
argue later their dissimilarity. The more churches insist that worshipping
God is just like cheering for the Yankees, the harder it will be to argue that
worship is distinct and different. Churches cannot argue the “transcendence” of worship when all along they have equated worship with the earthly
pleasures of pep rallies and football games. And that is problematic, because, as illustrated above, sometimes the equality of religion to secular
expression does not suffice to provide constitutional protection.
Religious individuals and institutions are already reaping the consequences of an overreliance on an equality argument. Look no further than
Employment Division v. Smith.284 There, the Court held, as Doug Laycock
describes, “that neutral and generally applicable criminal prohibitions on
worship service[s] raise no issue under the Free Exercise Clause.”285 “A law
that burdens religious exercise—however substantially and however core
the religious practice—requires no special justification under the Federal
Free Exercise Clause if it is”286 “a general law not aimed at the promotion
or restriction of religious beliefs.”287 So long as religious beliefs receive
equal treatment under the law, it does not matter that the law burdens religious exercise.
A public university, for instance, can force a graduate student to counsel GLBT couples contrary to her religious beliefs as a condition to obtaining her master’s degree.288 The school’s curricular requirement, said the
Eleventh Circuit, “is neutral and generally applicable.”289 According to the
court, “In seeking to evade the curricular requirement . . . , [the student] is
looking for preferential, not equal, treatment.”290 Likewise, a city can pass a
zoning ordinance to shut down a church’s homeless shelter even when the
court conceded that “sheltering the homeless is an essential aspect of the

284. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
285. Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 755, 767 n.37 (1999) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 879).
286. Id. at 767.
287. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
594-95 (1940)).
288. See Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 880 (11th Cir. 2011).
289. Id.
290. Id.
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Christian religion.”291 “This ordinance, as passed,” said the court, “zones an
entire residential area . . . . It is neutral on its face and is of general applicability.”292
For churches to argue equal access is expedient. It is the easiest avenue
of attacking the current crunch imposed by cities and counties on church
worship services. After all, it has worked for the almost thirty-five years
since Widmar. But in the long run the equal access argument will make life
harder for churches. The time will come when only the specialness of religious worship will justify its constitutional protection. And then it will be
too late. The churches gave it up for a mess of pottage.293
C.

LACKING INTEGRITY

For churches to say one thing and do another lacks integrity. The
churches know what they are doing when they gather for worship. They
gather to engage with God—to meet with Him on His terms. When churches represent in litigation that they do anything less, simply put, they are
lying. Lying means “intending or serving to convey a false impression.” 294
The churches in cases like Bronx Household and Faith Center Church are
intentionally conveying the impression that their worship services are no
different than any other community meeting, just with a religious twist.
That is untrue.
Sure, the churches can justify the lie as a litigation tactic. Likening religious worship to secular speech from fan clubs and political associations
is the only way to scrunch worship into the mold of equal access. The
churches are just making the argument they need to make to secure meeting
space and then they can carry on being as religious as they want to be. It is
all very user-friendly. But it is not living up to the “high calling” God places on the church.295
Jesus says, “You therefore must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is
perfect.”296 The Apostle Paul seconds this. He writes to the church at Philippi: “[B]e blameless and innocent, children of God without blemish in the
midst of a crooked and twisted generation, among whom you shine as lights
in the world.”297 Obviously, as the Apostle James said: “[W]e all stumble in
291. First Assembly of God v. Collier Cnty., 20 F.3d 419, 422-23 (11th Cir. 1994).
292. Id. at 423.
293. See Genesis 25:29-34 (King James) (Essua sells his birthright to Jacob for a
“pottage of lentils”).
294. Lie, DICTIONARY.COM UNABRIDGED, perma.cc/JU3S-RSSG.
295. Philippians 3:14 (King James) (Apostle Paul writes, “I press toward the mark
for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus.”).
296. Matthew 5:48 (English Standard).
297. Philippians 2:15 (English Standard).
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many ways.”298 That is why Christians need the Gospel—the good news
that “[a] holy God sends his righteous Son to die for unrighteous sinners so
we can be holy and live happily with God forever.”299 But that does not
diminish the high calling of the church.
The Ninth Commandment says, “You shall not bear false witness
against your neighbor.”300 The Westminster Larger Catechism elaborates.
The commandment includes any “speaking untruth, lying, slandering,
backbiting, detracting, tale bearing, whispering, scoffing, reviling, rash,
harsh, and partial censuring; misconstruing intentions, words, and actions.”301 The demands of the law are clear. Churches should not flout them
for the sake of securing a place to meet. It is pragmatic but not in line with
the church’s high calling.

VI. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?
The Free Exercise Clause provides an easy response to these critiques
of the equal access argument.302 First, the Free Exercise Clause obviates the
need for churches to denigrate religious worship to claim constitutional
protection. A church can assert a successful free exercise claim without
needing to show its religious worship is “similarly situated” to any secular
speech allowed by the government. The church need only prove that the
government’s denial of access has “in a selective manner impose[d] burdens . . . on conduct motivated by religious belief.”303 Gone are the strained
comparisons of a worship service to a political rally or a sporting event.
Second, free exercise maintains the specialness of religion. “[T]he Free
Exercise Clause . . . , by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of
religion.”304 By its very nature, free exercise is rooted in the distinctiveness
of religion, rather than its alleged similarity to secular expression. The
298.
299.

James 3:2 (English Standard).
What’s the Message of the Bible in One Sentence?, STRAWBERRY-RHUBARB
THEOLOGY Jan. 12, 2011, perma.cc/FAX4-XY9D (quoting Kevin DeYoung).
300. Exodus 20:16 (English Standard).
301. CTR. FOR REFORMED THEOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS, Westminster Larger Catechism, Q. 145, perma.cc/7WMB-BYKC.
302. The idea of arguing equal access cases as free exercise cases is nothing new.
Many of the early cases in which religious groups challenged a school’s denial of access
were brought as free exercise cases. See, e.g., Keegan v. Univ. of Del., 349 A.2d 14 (Del.
1975).
303. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543
(1993). See also id. at 532 (“At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause
pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”).
304. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981). See also Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (“[T]he First Amendment itself . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.”).
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clause protects religion because religion alone makes claims on its adherents that supersede those of the government. Finally, free exercise allows
churches to be honest about what they are doing. They can present worship
as what it is—a meeting with God—rather than presenting it as a fan club
with a religious spin.
To prove a free exercise claim, churches must show that the government’s imposition of restrictions is either “not neutral (i.e., if it discriminates against religiously motivated conduct) or is not generally applicable
(i.e., if it proscribes particular conduct only or primarily when religiously
motivated).”305 This is not difficult to prove in most cases where the government bans religious worship. The government’s policies on building use
frequently target religious worship for exclusion.
The school district’s policy in Bronx Household, for instance, permitted school facilities to be “used during after-school hours for a broad range
of purposes, including ‘social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community.’”306
But the policy flatly excluded religious worship. “No permit shall be granted for the purpose of holding religious worship services, or otherwise using
a school as a house of worship.”307 Likewise, the library’s policy in Faith
Center Church provided that “[n]on-profit and civic organizations, forprofit organizations, schools and governmental organizations” may use the
meeting room space for “meetings, programs, or activities of educational,
cultural or community interest.”308 But the library’s use policy singled out
religious worship services: “the library meeting room ‘shall not be used for
religious services.’”309 The policies give community groups access to meeting space for virtually any use except for religious worship. That is precisely the kind of targeting of religion that the Free Exercise Clause forbids.
The free exercise analysis is straightforward. But there are some
catches. First, it is questionable whether denying churches permission to
305. Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 165 (3d Cir.
2002). See also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32 (“In addressing the constitutional protection for
free exercise of religion, our cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral
and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even
if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Neutrality and
general applicability are interrelated, and, as becomes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy
one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied. A law failing to
satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must
be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”) (internal citations omitted).
306. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting N.Y. Educ. Code § 414(1)(c) (McKinney 2006)) (Bronx Household III).
307. Id. at 94.
308. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 902 (9th Cir.
2006).
309. Id. at 903.
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worship in a public building actually imposes a substantial burden on their
free exercise of religion. The Second Circuit, the lone appellate court to
consider the question, said no. The school district’s exclusion, the Second
Circuit said, “represents only a decision by the Board not to subsidize religious worship services by providing rent-free school facilities in which to
conduct them.”310 The court concluded that the Board’s policy “imposes no
burden on any religion, leaving all free to conduct worship services wherever they choose other than the Board’s schools.”311
The Second Circuit’s analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
recent treatment of access to meeting space for religious student organizations and community groups as a government subsidy rather than as a right.
In these circumstances, the Supreme Court said, the government “is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of prohibition.”312 The
groups are free to speak, worship, and associate however they choose. They
simply must “forgo[] the benefits of official recognition.”313 Similarly, it
could be argued, the churches being denied meeting space are free to worship however they want. They simply must do it somewhere other than the
local school building or library meeting room.314
The dilemma with this free exercise analysis is that meeting space is
not fungible for churches. Pastors and denominations choose locations for
churches because they want to serve the people of that particular community. Telling a church it can hold a worship service across town is not an adequate substitute. It defeats the purpose for why the location was chosen in
the first instance. Moreover, as Erik Stanley from the Alliance Defending
Freedom notes: “This approach disregards the many startup churches who
can only afford to rent government school facilities. It also ignores that in
places like Hawaii and New York City, property is at a premium with fre310. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 750 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2014)
[hereinafter Bronx Household V], cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1730 (2015) (Mem.).
311. Id. at 200.
312. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2975 (2010).
313. Id. at 682.
314. The Second Circuit’s analysis also squares with how courts have addressed free
exercises challenges by churches denied zoning permits. See, e.g., Messiah Baptist Church v.
Cty. of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 823 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Church has not been denied a right to
exercise a religious preference. Rather, the church has been denied a building permit, and
may not construct its house of worship where it please.”); Lakewood Ohio Congregation of
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating
that building place of worship “has no religious or ritualistic significance,” and is a “purely
secular act of building,” “at most . . . tangentially related” to freedom to worship); International Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of Chi. Heights, 955 F. Supp. 878, 880 (N.D.
Ill. 1996) (“The impact is not upon the content of religious practices but only upon where
that religion may be practiced. Having a church facility is important to the Church, but specific location is not.”).
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quently nowhere for churches to meet other than public buildings.”315 For a
court, like the Second Circuit, to rule that a church’s free exercise rights are
not burdened by the denial of meeting space is divorced from the reality of
how and why churches choose to rent space from the government.
The second concern is the Establishment Clause—the concern that, by
hosting and subsidizing religious worship services, the government would
appear to endorse religion. That concern is largely unfounded because
churches generally are seeking access to facilities that the government has
already made available to other groups. The Supreme Court ruled way back
in Widmar that “the Establishment Clause” does not “bar a policy of equal
access, in which facilities are open to groups and speakers of all kinds”—
both secular and religious.316 The hang-up may be “cases in which religious
groups claim that the denial of facilities not available to other groups deprives them of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause.”317 The Supreme
Court has suggested that these cases would be “different,” but has not explained why.318
Thus, both concerns—the lack of a burden on free exercise rights and
the impermissible endorsement of religion—are more hypothetical than
realistic. Practically, churches choose locations for meetings with the intent
of reaching particular neighborhoods. The possibility of meeting in some
other location does nothing to alleviate the burden of being denied the ability to meet in the intended neighborhood. Churches are also not seeking to
rent government spaces that are closed to other groups. They want to rent
spaces that local school boards and libraries have already made available
for community use. Neither concern should pose a real obstacle to a
church’s free exercise claim.
All that being said, the better solution is for churches to just walk
away. Forgo the urge to claim their “rights.” Persecution (if we can even
call a denial of meeting space that) is normal for Christians. “All who desire
to live a godly life in Christ Jesus will be persecuted.”319 “Beloved, do not
be surprised at the fiery trial when it comes upon you to test you, as though
something strange were happening to you.”320 “Through many tribulations
we must enter the kingdom of God.”321
The Christian’s response to such persecution should be joy, not legal
action. “We rejoice in our sufferings, knowing that suffering produces en315. Erik Stanley, Churches and Government Facilities: A Battleground for the
Gospel, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM BLOG (Apr. 28, 2014), perma.cc/3SFJ-PWKA.
316. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
317. Id. at 273 n.13.
318. See id.
319. 2 Timothy 3:12 (English Standard).
320. 1 Peter 4:12 (English Standard).
321. Acts 14:22 (English Standard).
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durance.”322 “Blessed are you when others . . . persecute you . . . . Rejoice
and be glad, for your reward is great in heaven.”323 “Count it all joy, my
brothers, when you meet trials of various kinds, for your know that the testing of your faith produces steadfastness.”324 “[T]hey left the presence of the
council, rejoicing that they were counted worthy to suffer dishonor for the
name.”325
Do not misunderstand. The source of the Christian’s joy is not a Pollyanna worldview, naively ignoring the difficulties of this world. Nor is it
somehow ginning up joy by sheer force of will. Rather the Christian has joy
because she recognizes that “[t]his world is not my home, I’m just apassing through.”326 Christians, the Apostle Peter said, are “sojourners and
exiles.”327
The Apostle Paul says of the Christian that her “citizenship is in heaven.”328 The author of Hebrews put it this way: “[Y]ou had compassion on
those in prison, and you joyfully accepted the plundering of your property,
since you knew that you yourselves had a better possession and an abiding
one.”329
The Christian can have joy when the government treats her poorly because she is sure that, whatever this world may dish out, she has “an inheritance that is imperishable, undefiled, and unfading, kept in heaven for
[her].”330 She has a “deep, unshakeable confidence that the joy [she has]
tasted in fellowship with Christ will not disappoint [her] in death.”331
Jesus provides the example. “For the joy that was set before him [he]
endured the cross.”332 He endured the cross though he unquestionably “had
an inalienable right not to be nailed to one.”333 Should not His followers be
willing to do the same with their rights?

322. Romans 5:3 (English Standard).
323. Matthew 5:11-12 (English Standard).
324. James 1:2-3 (English Standard).
325. Acts 5:41 (English Standard).
326. J.R. BAXTER, JR., THIS WORLD IS NOT MY HOME (Stamps-Baxter Music & Prtg.
Co. 1946), perma.cc/44ZJ-C266.
327. 1 Peter 2:11 (English Standard).
328. Philippians 3:20 (English Standard).
329. Hebrews 10:34 (English Standard).
330. 1 Peter 1:4 (English Standard).
331. JOHN PIPER, WHEN I DON’T DESIRE GOD 21 (Crossway Books 2004).
332. Hebrews 12:2 (English Standard).
333. JASON J. STELLMAN, DUAL CITIZENS: WORSHIP AND LIFE BETWEEN THE ALREADY
AND THE NOT YET 163 (Reformation Trust Publishing 2009).
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CONCLUSION
When churches and their lawyers force worship into the mold of equal
access, they do a disservice. They harm not only themselves but also the
broader cause of religious liberty. Equal access has always been rooted in
principles of equal protection. The argument obligates churches to show
that their religious worship is “similarly situated” to the secular expression
already allowed by the government. That cannot be done without demeaning the sacredness of religious worship. Such disparagement will inevitably
make it harder for churches and their congregants to claim constitutional
protection when only the specialness of religion will justify affording that
protection. The Free Exercise Clause offers an alternative argument that
sidesteps the problems of equal access. In the worship cases that have arisen thus far, the government has singled out religious worship for exclusion.
That kind of targeting cannot stand up under the Free Exercise Clause. But
perhaps it would be best if churches just went along and not bothered.
Christian believers have a far greater inheritance in Christ than a classroom,
a meeting room, or a cafeteria. “Therefore let us go to him outside the camp
and bear the reproach he endured. For here we have no lasting city, but we
seek the city that is to come.”334

334.

Hebrews 13:13-14 (English Standard).

